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Jobbik, an ultra-nationalist party in Hungary, was founded in 2003.  By 2010, this party 
had secured national parliamentary representation and sent three representatives to the 
European parliament. 
In its manifesto and public speeches, Jobbik has called for Hungary to leave the 
European Union and possibly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to forge 
relations with, among other Eastern countries, Russia, China, and Iran. Meanwhile, the 
group rattles sabers—and nerves—on Hungary’s uneasy borders with Slovakia and 
Romania, states with significant Magyar minorities.  
This thesis seeks to answer the following questions: What will a Jobbik-
influenced Hungary mean for Europe and the European Union confronted by political, 
social and economic turmoil that can swiftly has security implications? What, if anything, 
can the EU or NATO do to influence the path of a once-promising democracy in the heart 
of Europe and the resurgent nationalist conflict in Eastern Europe? 
This thesis concludes that Hungary will maintain its strategic usefulness to NATO 
regardless of whether it can maintain a Western-styled democracy—NATO’s other Allies 
will be content to defer action to other European institutions. The EU’s previous attempts 
to influence far-right governments have failed and many of the EU’s member states have 
human rights issues of their own—The EU is not likely to take meaningful action against 
Jobbik. Therefore, it is up to the Hungarians to save their own democracy. 
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I. JOBBIK: A BETTER HUNGARY AT THE COST OF EUROPE 
Jobbik, an ultra-nationalist party in Hungary, was founded in 2003. By 2010, this 
party had captured 16 percent of the popular vote in the Hungarian parliamentary 
elections and sent three representatives to the European parliament. The Hungarian 
Guard, created by Jobbik leadership, descended upon Roma neighborhoods as a show of 
force and intimidation, giving form to Jobbik’s motto that Hungary is for the Hungarians 
and that “Gypsy crime” will not be tolerated. Jobbik has quickly gained international 
notoriety for anti-Semitic remarks and policy proposals. 
In its manifesto and public speeches, Jobbik has called for Hungary to leave the 
European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to forge 
relations with, among other Eastern countries, Russia, China, and Iran. Meanwhile, the 
group rattles sabers—and nerves—on Hungary’s uneasy borders with Slovakia and 
Romania, states with significant Magyar minorities. The party’s 16 percent share of the 
electorate may not, in itself, bode ill for Hungary’s democratic future among the 
institutions of pluralist, liberal, western values—yet. But Jobbik’s fortunes are rising—as 
is the profile of the hard right generally in Hungary. This phenomenon mirrors the rise of 
neo-Nazi, radical right-wing and/or populist, nationalist movements not only in Central 
Europe, but in Western Europe as well. 
Jobbik, as a movement and a legitimate political power in Hungary, seems to 
threaten to re-establish an autocratic or even fascist government in a country still 
struggling with its fascist and authoritarian past in the twentieth century. Meanwhile, the 
rest of Europe looks on, with its proverbial finger wagging about the pluralism and 
inclusive values upon which the EU has been erected, but which in the year 2014 are 
under assault from forces with strong resonances from a very unhappy past of integral 
nationalism, violence and conflict in Central Europe As the sides square off, the basic 
questions remain unanswered: What will a Jobbik-influenced Hungary mean for Europe 




swiftly has security implications? What, if anything, can the EU or NATO do to influence 
the path of a once-promising democracy in the heart of Europe and the resurgent 
nationalist conflict in Eastern Europe? 
A. IMPORTANCE  
Jobbik has caught the attention of the West; even if the party never amasses the 
votes to obtain a parliamentary majority, it has already shown it can pressure mainstream 
politics toward the extreme right.1 Hungarian democracy hangs in the balance; its fall 
may pull Hungary out of the EU and will surely create shockwaves throughout the 
region. Those who principal role it is to assure the security of the Euro-Atlantic area must 
realize that Jobbik should not be underestimated. 
Hungary was in the first round of enlargement of NATO in 1999, along with the 
Czech Republic and Poland. Thus, it had at first a favored status that owed in part to 
Hungarian martyrdom in 1956, as well as to the nation’s claim to belong to the heart of a 
free Europe. As such, both Hungary and its western allies have political and strategic 
reasons to favor a stable, democratic Hungary in the middle of Europe. Jobbik’s 
increasing electoral success raises concerns about the future of Hungary in NATO. For 
example, on the operational level, Hungary is also home to a key NATO mobility air 
base—against which Jobbik rails as another instance of great-power meddling in its 
affairs as in times past when Turks, Austrians, Germans, or Soviets intruded along the 
Danube and the Carpathians.  
Moreover, Hungary is surrounded in the heart of the continent by other Central 
and Eastern European countries that are also struggling to fortify their fledgling 
democracies now in an era of crisis following the high-flying hopes of the 1990s. 
Hungary has historic border disputes with Slovakia and Romania, to name a few, and 
Jobbik has made the nullification of the Trianon Treaty and the Beneš decree a key pillar 
of its platform. A Jobbik-led government, or even a sufficiently influenced coalition, thus 
                                                 
1 András Bíró Nagy, Tamás Boros, and Zoltán Vasali, “More Radical than the Radicals: The Jobbik 
Party in International Comparison,” in Right-Wing Extremism in Europe, ed. Ralf Melzer and Sebastian 
Serafin (Frankfurt: Druck, 2013), 243–50. 
 3 
could result in a destabilized region and renationalized militaries in Central Europe, 
further imperiling the progress and stability of the EU and the Atlantic alliance.2 
Although it is difficult to speculate about the alliances a Jobbik-led Hungary 
might succeed in establishing, Jobbik has made it clear that the party wishes to establish 
economic and political relationships with Russia, China, and various countries in the 
Middle East and Central Asia. Should these plans become reality, they may further Prime 
Minister Putin’s vision of creating a Eurasian Union to compete with the European Union 
and re-extend Russia’s influence into Europe. Other Central and Eastern European 
countries, struggling with democracy and less-than-anticipated economic success from 
Europe, are sure to be watching Hungary and could follow its lead. These scenarios are of 
keen interest to NATO and the U.S. government.3 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Influential European countries, and the EU as a whole, have been unable or 
unwilling to effect change in Hungarian politics regarding human rights. The fact that the 
EU was quick to condemn new economic policies, enacted by Hungary’s Orban 
government, shows that the eye of the West is upon them.4 Why, then, is the powerful 
EU content to wring its hands in the face of a surging extreme right in Hungary? The 
shared problem of extremist groups throughout Europe is one hypothesis. Extreme right 
groups exist in nearly every European country with varying levels of prominence.5 It 
seems that many EU member states are dealing with their own issues concerning far-right 
extremism—and these issues prevent them from acting in an effective and united manner 
against Hungary. Moreover, a resistance against encroaching globalization and the 
attending mixture of ethnic populations is a phobia that has found a welcome home 
                                                 
2 Jobbik, “Radical Change: A Guide to Jobbik’s Parliamentary Electoral Manifesto for National Self-
Determination and Social Justice” (Jobbik Foreign Affairs Committee, 2010), 15, 21, 
http://www.jobbik.com/sites/default/files/Jobbik-RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf. 
3 Ibid., 2–3. 
4 “Backing Down Gently; Hungary and the European Union,” The Economist, February 25, 2012. 
5 Peter Rieker, Michaela Glaser, and Silke Schuster, Prevention of Right-Wing Extremism, Xenophobia 
and Racism in European Perspective (Halle: Deutsches Jugendinstitut, 2006), 1–126; Ralf Melzer and 
Sebastian Serafin, eds., Right-Wing Extremism in Europe (Frankfurt: Druck, 2013), 5–8. 
 4 
among the traditional cultures across the continent. The unwillingness of many EU 
nations to seriously confront the issue of far-right extremism results in its inability to deal 
with Jobbik with any level of legitimacy. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is no shortage of scholarly articles describing the resurgent threat of 
fascism in the Carpathian Basin—the heart of Europe. Whether Jobbik is populist, 
extreme right, ultra-nationalist, or neo-fascist is up for debate, but in the end it may not 
matter. What is not debatable is the troubling and meaningful nature of the actions the 
party condones and the rhetoric proudly proclaimed from rallies in large cities and the 
intimidating marches in small villages. 
1. Jobbik’s Constituency: Confounding Observers’ Expectations 
At some level, Jobbik may look like a throwback to Hungarian fascism, but there 
is rather more going on in the party and in society that gives Jobbik a particular—and 
very contemporary—relevance. Griffin, Payne, and Paxton6 provide a general foundation 
to consider fascism in general and Hungarian fascism more specifically. Kenez again, 
along with Cohen and Weber,7 provides a glimpse into Hungary’s particular relationship 
with fascism. 
Karácsony’s study8 reveals that the Roma issue crosses all party lines and gives 
Jobbik significant relevance and staying power as far as politics are concerned. 
Karácsony’s, Barlai’s, and Bartlett’s9 studies conclude that Jobbik is not the stereotypical 
hooligan cell of neo-Nazis. They are not a group of unemployed, disenfranchised, 
                                                 
6 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (New York: Routledge, 1993), 4–8; Stanley G. Payne, A 
History of Fascism, 1914–1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 7, 267–76; Robert O. 
Paxton, “The Five Stages of Fascism,” The Journal of Modern History 70, no. 1 (1998): 21–22; Robert O. 
Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 20–26. 
7 Asher Cohen, “Continuity in the Change: Hungary, 19 March 1944,” Jewish Social Studies 46, no. 2 
(1984): 133; Eugen Weber, Varieties of Fascism: Doctrines of Revolution in the Twentieth Century 
(Malabar: Krieger Publishing Company, 1982), 271–76. 
8 Gergely Karácsony and Dániel Róna, “The Secret of Jobbik: Reasons Behind the Rise of the 
Hungarian Radical Right,” Journal of East European and Asian Studies 2, no. 1 (2011): 61–92. 
9 Jamie Bartlett et al., Populism in Europe: Hungary (London: Demos, 2012), 85. 
 5 
skinheads who look for minorities to beat once they have had a few drinks. Jobbik is not 
satisfied with being a thorn in the side of the ruling party, but genuinely expects to be the 
ruling party. While there is a meaningful portion of undereducated and unemployed 
young men represented in the party, Jobbik’s membership rolls include 
disproportionately high numbers of men and women with graduate-level education. This 
population at least ought to have something to lose in an anti-liberal political and social 
system, and yet great swathes of Hungary’s middle and professional classes have found 
an ideological home in Jobbik. Barlai’s conclusion summarizes the prevalent over-
simplification regarding Jobbik: 
The fact is that Jobbik’s … supporters are motivated in large part by a 
desire to protect identity, ideological and cultural considerations rather 
than economic ones. Therefore, the interpretation of Jobbik’s success as a 
mere political consequence of the economic crisis is a false simplification. 
The results also stress that the Jobbik party should not be grouped together 
with other nationalist populist parties in Western Europe. While there are 
obvious similarities, the demographics, concerns and attitudes of Jobbik 
supporters—as well as the Hungarian context—differ in significant 
ways.10 
Part of the story is the shift in prevailing views about the way forward in 
Hungary. Bartlett’s study points out that far-right views have become surprisingly 
mainstream. A significant majority of Hungarians polled believed that Hungary would 
benefit from an “iron-fist” ruler, while another poll revealed a 23 percent decrease in 
respondents affirming that fascist groups are a danger to society.11 Whatever stigma 
might have attached to fascism, even openly espoused, seems to be fading in Hungary. 
Not all analysts agree on the characterization of Jobbik or the significance (or 
even the existence) of major discontinuities with earlier fascist forms in Hungary. For 
example, Kulinska12 portrays Jobbik as a traditional fascist party, consisting of mostly 
young, economically depressed activists, arguing that Jobbik’s popularity soared based 
                                                 
10 Melani Barlai, “Jobbik on the Web: Right-Wing Extremism in Hungary,” Call for Papers: 
CeDEM12: Proceedings of the International Conference for E-Democracy and Open Government, 2013, 
236. 
11 Bartlett et al., Populism in Hungary, 27. 
12 Elena Kulinska, “The European Extreme Right in 2010: A New Phenomenon or the Same Pattern?,” 
Western Balkans Security Observer (English ed.) 5, no. 17 (2010): 57. 
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on its oversimplified, unprofessional, yet promising economic solutions. These voters, 
according to Kulinska, were eager to believe in the solutions and accept the party even if 
they might not agree with other, less savory, portions of the party’s platform, namely 
anti-Semitism and abuse of the Roma minority. Jordan13 also seems to conclude that 
Jobbik’s rise in popularity comes from the economic situation and Jobbik’s ability to 
exploit Hungarian disillusion. 
While Kulinska’s argument seems to be widely accepted and propagated, the 
conclusions drawn from Karácsony, Barlai, and Bartlett suggest that economic suffering 
contributes only one tile to the mosaic that is Hungarian extremism. The previously 
mentioned studies reveal that Jobbik’s popularity draws from a wide swath of the 
Hungarian population. While many of them may not yet feel comfortable associating 
themselves with Jobbik, it is clear they can sympathize. Any attempt to portray Jobbik as 
a marginal extremist group, born only of economic strife, misses the complex Hungarian 
context. 
Hungary’s virulent anti-Semitism was a major player in provincial and national 
politics and eventually gave way to fascism. Many countries in Europe flirted with 
fascism, but Hungary is one of the few countries where a fascist government actually 
came to power. It remains unclear if Jobbik will eventually take up the mantle of its 
fascist fathers but it seems evident that its motives and proposals are cut from the same 
cloth. 
2. Jobbik Policies: A Guilty Pleasure throughout the European Right 
For all these policies and positions, Jobbik is featured prominently in European 
headlines; Western European leaders are quick to condemn the group’s anti-Semitic 
posturing and members’ maltreatment of the Roma. Meaningful actions, however, have 




                                                 
13 Michael J. Jordan, “The Roots of Hate,” World Policy Journal 27, no. 3 (2010): 100–101. 
 7 
actions in response to Jobbik because many of the EU countries have extreme-right 
movements similar to Jobbik within their own borders, guilty of many of the same 
contemptible behaviors.14  
Many countries—for example, Germany—limit recognition of minorities, 
especially the Roma, in order to prevent the necessity of granting them rights. Other 
countries have refused to sign treaties designed to protect the rights of minorities, and the 
Roma in Italy15 may fare no better than the Roma in Hungary.16 Anti-Semitism within 
Europe justifiably seems to draw quick and severe domestic and international outcries; 
Muslim-directed discrimination garners some attention. Maltreatment of the Roma, 
however, receives comparatively little notice. It is possible that Jobbik may continue to 
persecute the Roma and receive nothing other than strongly worded letters from 
international organizations. Germany, Italy, and France may not take action against 
Hungary at the risk of similar actions toward their countries.  
European economic woes, particularly in the so-called euro-zone, clearly 
contribute to the general trend on the continent toward right-wing or populist parties—
though few of the older EU states acknowledge the issue. For example, Kulinska 
describes extreme-right movements within France, Belgium, and Austria, which have 
existed for decades, yet have not experienced electoral success until recently. She argues 
that both the EU and individual countries have ignored the extreme movements and have 
failed to present meaningful solutions to economic chaos. This ambivalence fostered a 
power vacuum for the extreme right to occupy. Right-wing extremism, it would seem, is 
a widespread problem in Europe; it just so happens that Hungary’s skeletons have opened 
the door to their closet. 
                                                 
14 Cas Mudde, “Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe,” East European Politics & Societies 
19, no. 2 (2005): 161–184. 
15 Michael Johns, “‘Do As I Say, Not As I Do’: The European Union, Eastern Europe and Minority 
Rights,” East European Politics & Societies 17, no. 4 (2003): 695. 
16 Sohrab Ahmari, “Dancing Over Catastrophes: The Far Right and Roma in Hungary,” Dissent 59, 
no. 1 (2012): 16–21, DOI:10.1353/dss.2012.0002. 
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3. Ramifications 
The possibility of Hungary returning to fascism is a sobering thought, but a 
logical question follows such an outcome. A dictator-led Hungary, determined to leave 
the EU and NATO, would most likely seek to replace economic and security-based 
alliances. Where would they go and what would it mean for Europe? What other 
consequences would come as a result of a dictatorship in the heart of Europe? Kagan17 
explores possible alliances that Hungary might pursue. Russia and China have a history 
of supporting countries that act against the wishes of the West. Kagan’s article supports 
Jobbik statements and press releases claiming that Jobbik is actively working toward 
economic alliances with Russia, Central and East Asia, Turkey, and the Middle East. 
While it is doubtful that Jobbik would trade membership in one union for another, the 
European Union would certainly not welcome the loss of Hungary to Putin’s proposed 
Eurasian Union. 
Largely missing from the reviewed literature is any discussion of the possible 
fallout for Europe if Hungary continues its backslide from democracy. While there are 
many articles devoted to the human rights situation, few look beyond to what other 
dominos might fall. NATO is surely aware of Jobbik’s desire to renationalize Hungary’s 
defense and possibly withdraw from the Alliance. A Jobbik-led government is certain to 
create increased tensions along the borders; the real or perceived maltreatment of ethnic 
Hungarians in Romania or Slovakia could possibly be another Eastern European powder 
keg. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Research for this thesis was conducted as both a historical study on Hungary as 
well as a case study of Jobbik. The historical portion of the research was limited only to 
the episodes that are deemed relevant to the formation of Hungary’s less-than-fully-
European identity as well as events that were influential to Hungary’s prevalent view of 
victimization at the hands of foreign powers. 
                                                 
17 Robert Kagan, “League of Dictators?,” The Washington Post, April 30, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/28/AR2006042801987.html. 
 9 
Materials for this research were limited to scholarly articles and books, relevant 
online periodicals as well as Internet publications issued by Jobbik. The material 
consisted mainly of English-language sources but included several Hungarian-language 
sources with the thesis author’s translation to English. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The next chapter includes a brief historical overview of Hungary including its 
previous experiences with fascism during World War II. The historical portion is 
important to frame what makes Hungary unique in Europe and why their extreme 
tendencies should be viewed with serious concern. 
The third chapter logically transitions to the forces and environment that 
facilitated the creation of Jobbik in 2003 as well as its rise to parliamentary representation 
in 2010. It describes Jobbik’s domestic and international policies, focusing on those that 
give Jobbik its extreme profile.  
Chapter IV documents Jobbik’s connection with the Hungarian Guard and its 
potential to become a militant enforcer for a strong national party and government. It 
explores links and similarities between the modern guard and the World War II-era 
gendarmerie, which proved to be an efficient facilitator of Jewish deportation and other 
heinous acts.  
Chapter V covers the ramifications of an autocratic or fascist state within the heart 
of Europe and discusses possible effects within NATO and the EU, as well as possible 
conflicts with nearby European nations. Chapter V also discusses what NATO and the 
EU can and should do to influence the course of Hungarian political and social changes. 
Finally, this chapter also discusses why Europe may not be able to effectively address the 
issues raised by Jobbik due to common extreme movements in many EU member states.  
 10 
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II. THE HISTORY OF ANTI-SEMITISM AND FASCISM IN 
HUNGARY 
To many observers of politics and security in Europe, particularly outside 
Hungary, Jobbik seems to draw on or continue the country’s unhappy modern experience 
of anti-Semitism and ultra-nationalism—if not outright fascism in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. All of these terms have very specific meanings within Hungarian 
history, however. This same history has informed and influenced Jobbik’s development, 
though not, perhaps, in the ways that the handiest political labels might imply. 
A. JEWS AND ANTI-SEMITISM IN HUNGARY’S PAST 
To understand the sustained undercurrent of animosity between a large segment 
of so-called native Hungarians and Jewish Hungarians, one must appreciate the 
unexpected relationship between the two sides, dating back to the politics and society of 
the late seventeenth century. Amid circumstances peculiar to Hungary and the Habsburg 
lands in the east, the Hungarian Jews found themselves in a position of power and 
influence, lasting from the late eighteenth century through the interwar period. Peter 
Kenez captures the vital distinction for Jews in Hungary: 
Hungarian Jewry was unique; its history was full of paradoxes and 
contradictions. Nowhere else did Jews come closer to dominating the 
economy and cultural life of a nation, nowhere else did the Jews play a 
more crucial role in the leadership of Marxist socialism, and nowhere else 
was the gap wider between assimilated and Orthodox Jews.18 
Following the occupation of the Ottoman Empire, which ended in the seventeenth 
century with the victory of Habsburg armies in the so-called Turkish wars, Hungary was 
faced with a population shortage and a stagnant economy. The local nobility was eager to 
allow immigrants into the kingdom and contribute to its post-occupation revival; among 
the newcomers was a relatively small population of Jews as well as the Danube Swabians 
                                                 
18 Peter Kenez, The Coming of the Holocaust: From Antisemitism to Genocide (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 52.  
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from western Germany.19 These outsiders were welcomed along with the toleration tax20 
they would pay to the nobility in return for the promise of a better life.21 While the 
growing Hungarian Jewry did not escape completely from varying degrees of 
discrimination, Jews in Habsburg Hungary enjoyed more freedom and greater economic 
opportunities as compared to Jews in the Romanov parts of Poland or in Russia.22 
This difference in the experience of Hungarian Jews, in turn, inspired a somewhat 
different variety of anti-Semitism as it emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth century—
one based on distrust, mutual violence, and xenophobia but also entwined in Hungary’s 
national development in very particular ways that diverge from the experience of Jews 
and nationalism in say France, Germany or Russia. In a sense, the record of anti-
Semitism in Hungary is also the story of Hungary’s distinct path to (or toward) European 
history.23 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 52–53. Kenez notes that a small population of Jews lived in the lands that would become 
Hungary from the time of the Romans; however, most of the Jews that settled in Hungary came from 
Bohemia, Moravia, and other Hapsburg regions. By the early eighteenth century, the Jewish population in 
Hungary was estimated to be 18,000. 
20 Ibid. The tolerance tax—essentially a levy on a given Jewish community for residence permission—
was a regular obligation of most established Jewish populations in Europe to their respective monarchs. 
Before emancipation, it was not uncommon for rulers, particularly those with mounting debts in the wars 
among the absolutist regimes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to extort additional “special 
taxes” to fill their coffers. For example, “in 1713, the Jews of Prussia had to pay 20,000 Taler [as a 
community] for confirmation of their privileges. In 1714, they paid 8,000 Taler to prevent a law requiring 
all Jews to wear red hats. In 1720, they gave [King Frederick William I] 20,000 Taler as a ‘free gift.’” 
Steven M. Lowenstein, The Berlin Jewish Community: Enlightenment, Family, and Crisis, 1770–1830 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 13. 
21 Moshe Y. Herczl, Christianity and the Holocaust of Hungarian Jewry, trans. Joel Lerner (New 
York: New York University Press, 1993), 6–8. Unprecedented levels of rights were granted to the Jews 
following Jewish participation in the 1848–49 war between Hungary and the Hapsburg dynasty. A law 
granting rights equal to any other Hungarian was adopted while the war was still being waged, but after the 
failure of the revolution, the Austrians stripped the newly endowed rights from the Jews. In 1867, following 
Hungary’s recognized independence in the dual monarchy, a bill was unanimously passed through 
Parliament granting Jews political and civil rights equal any other inhabitants of the kingdom. The 
unintended consequence of this law was an anti-Semitic awakening among the general population as well 
among certain members of Parliament. 
22 Kenez, Coming of the Holocaust, 52–53. 
23 Ibid., 54, 64–68. 
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1. Hungarian by Decree: Jewish Emancipation, Acculturation, and 
Assimilation 
In Hungary, Jewish emancipation coincided with the transition of the bourgeois in 
estate Europe to the middle class of the industrial, national epoch, beginning with the 
reign of Joseph II (Holy Roman Emperor from 1765 to 1790 and ruler of the Habsburg 
lands from 1780 to 1790) and finalizing after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 
1867. As in the West, breaking with the reactionary and intolerant legacy of the past, 
Joseph II sought to deal with the “Jewish question” by fostering the assimilation of the 
Habsburg Jews—thus ensuring their loyalty to the crown and freeing up the community’s 
potential as subjects and taxpayers.24 Schools and universities were opened to the Jews, 
and they were encouraged to learn German as the supra-national language of 
administration and assimilation in place of their native languages.25  
The emperor’s attempts to impose German-Austrian culture extended beyond the 
Jews to the rest of his subjects in the Hungarian half of the empire. Nineteenth-century 
Hungary was multicultural conglomeration of nations in the medieval sense and 
languages where native Hungarians were in the minority. Joseph II sought to use a united 
language and culture as a means to unite its people and centralize his Empire’s power. 
Things worked out rather differently in Hungary, however. “Ironically,” notes Kenez, 
“Joseph’s effort to impose Germanic culture was a great boost to the development of 
Hungarian nationalism … . Until this time being a member of the Hungarian nation 
meant possessing a set of political rights and privileges, regardless of language, but 
Joseph’s attempts to Germanize changed the concept of nation.”26 The Hungarian 
                                                 
24 Joseph II’s Edict of Toleration of 1782 started the process formally, although Jews in the empire 
continued to endure “endless restrictions, oppressive taxes, and a profoundly precarious legal status.” 
Marsha L. Rozenblit, “Jewish Assimilation in Habsburg Vienna,” in Assimilation and Community: The 
Jews in Nineteenth-Century Europe, ed. Jonathan Frankel and Steven J. Zipperstein (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 227. See also, David Vital, A People Apart: A Political History of the 
Jews in Europe 1789-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 36. 
25 Kenez, Coming of the Holocaust, 54; Robert Gildea, Barricades and Borders: Europe, 1800-1914, 
3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 257–58. One can argue that one of the goals of Joseph’s 
edict was to encourage assimilation—or, more precisely, to facilitate the disappearance of the Jews as 
distinctive, “alien” elements in the Habsburg realm—by making the edicts privileges contingent on such 
concrete steps toward acculturation as abandoning Hebrew and Yiddish. Vital, People Apart, 35–36. 
26 Kenez, Coming of the Holocaust, 55. 
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nationalists—by and large aristocrats—were determined to establish a nation based on a 
common culture and language—among their greatest allies were the Jews,27 caught up in 
the intellectual currents of the day, particularly assimilation, emancipation, and 
Enlightenment.28 “Of all the minorities that lived in the kingdom,” according to Kenez, 
“it was the Jewish minority that was the first, most successful, and most enthusiastic to 
convert to Hungarian culture, and language, while accepting the ruling classes’ definition 
of national interest.”29 
2. The Enlightenment: The Divergence of Two Europes 
Clearly, the Enlightenment played out differently in Hungary (and, indeed, in all 
of Eastern Europe) than the Western European “model,” with significant ramifications on 
all that followed in terms of modernization, nationalism, capitalism, and eventually mass 
politics and culture. In France and other like-minded revolutionary societies, people 
sought to be viewed as individuals as opposed to members of a designated estate, race, or 
religion. The eclipse and/or destruction of the feudal system in the nineteenth century 
gave way to the middle class: the bourgeoisie and an emerging merchant class. The 
Enlightenment paved the way for the scientific and industrial revolutions, with the native 
middle class seizing the opportunity to take its place in the new capitalist, industrialized 
market. By the mid-nineteenth century, Western Europe had a new economic, political, 
and social system, empowered by a middle class from all walks of life: former peasants 
and nobles, Catholics, Protestants and Jews alike.30 
                                                 
27 Oscar Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1964), 320–22. 
28 Ibid., 173. 
29 Kenez, The Coming of the Holocaust, 55; Michael K. Silber, “The Entrance of Jews into Hungarian 
Society in Vormärz: The Case of the ‘Casinos,’” in Assimilation and Community: The Jews in Nineteenth-
Century Europe, ed. Jonathan Frankel and Steven J. Zipperstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 285. Silber also notes the comparatively low interest among Hungarian Jews in Zionism or other 
forms of Jewish nationalism, even though Theodor Herzl, Zionism’s most prominent contemporary 
advocate, was born in Budapest. Ibid. 
30 Gildea, Barricades and Borders, 7–24; Ivan T. Berend, History Derailed: Central and Eastern 
Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 5–16; Kenez, 
Coming of the Holocaust, 11. 
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Meanwhile, Hungary, along with much of Central and Eastern Europe, 
experienced a second serfdom and feudal revival. Ottoman occupation, the Thirty Years’ 
War, and other catastrophes resulted in a decimated population in Europe, especially 
among the peasants. The West responded by decreasing obligated labor service for the 
peasants as well as lowering their rent. The East, on the other hand, imposed greater 
controls on peasant mobility and introduced increased requirements for indentured labor 
service. As a result, serfdom ended in the West and was reinforced in the East.31  
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, while the bounty of the 
Enlightenment—modernizing politics and economies, new and expanding opportunities 
for social and geographical mobility, and the rise of the modern nation—trickled down to 
most of the Western European population, however unevenly, the people of Europe’s 
eastern half seemed hopelessly estranged from the leading developments. This 
divergence was especially acute among the rural masses. The liberated peasantry in 
Western Europe continued its intellectual and economic rise, fueled by the 
Enlightenment; Jews and non-Jews alike flourished in the emerging bourgeoisie. The 
Eastern European peasantry languished in oppression, neglected by an intellectual 
awakening that came too late. While this circumstance allowed the Hungarian Jews to 
thrive as a discrete middle class, it also left great masses of Hungarians to seethe about 
the inequities of their time and place. With modernity, prosperity, and national self-
respect seemingly just out of reach, Hungary sublimated the frustrations of the age into 
increasing tensions between the anti-Enlightenment but pro-nationalist nobility and the 
continually suppressed peasantry.32 
3. Jews in Europe: Making the Most of a Bad Situation 
The Jews’ symbiotic relationship with the Hungarian nobles continued, earning 
them enviable positions of power and influence that was laden with the potential for 
eventual disaster in the age of nations and mass politics. This observation should not be 
                                                 
31 Berend, History Derailed, 18–20. 
32 Ibid., 34–35. As one signal example, the West had obtained 60 to 90 percent literacy by the year 
1800, while in Hungary, fewer than 10 percent of the youth attended school. Moreover, nearly 70 years 
later, only 31 percent of the Hungarian population was literate. Ibid.  
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interpreted to mean that they were universally or even generally liked by the non-Jewish 
majority—the Jews certainly could not hope to accede to the Hungarian gentry, even if 
the nobles recognized the Jewish grasp of markets, industry, and banking.33 The Jews 
proved to be invaluable, and in Hungary as nowhere else, irreplaceable. 
Over the course of centuries, many Jews acquired characteristics that would serve 
them well in the modernizing world. Some were acquired from their culture, others, 
ironically, were obtained as a result of restrictions placed on them as outsiders. Kenez, a 
Hungarian Jew and survivor of the holocaust, lists the characteristics thus: 
(1) The importance of engaging in…intellectual tasks, such as studying 
the Torah and Talmud, (2) the consequences of their exclusion from 
agriculture; (3) the Jews’ concentration in commercial and financial 
occupations; and (4) the consequences of belonging to a persecuted 
minority, including the need to rely on one another.34 
Religious education among the Jews held a place of paramount prestige. Young 
boys prepared for manhood by learning to understand and argue religious texts with their 
elders, a process that resulted in near-universal literacy among males. Poor religious 
scholars were held in similar esteem as their wealthy coreligionists. When emancipation 
diminished the primacy of Jewish religious education, these habits of mind and manner 
transferred easily to the new order. Kenez argues, “What mattered was engagement with 
intellectual issues, rather than the particular subject matter. What better preparation to be 
a lawyer in a modern state than training in the interpretation of a difficult passage in the 
Talmud?”35 
Perhaps even more instrumental in the Jews’ elevation to the middle class was 
their prohibition from agriculture in large swathes of Europe, from guilds, and from other 
occupations reserved for non-Jews. Because of these restrictions, Jews were not anchored 
to the medieval trades and skills soon to be lost to merchants and the Industrial 
Revolution, nor were they tied to the land via farms and mines. Thus, Jews were more 
                                                 
33 Silber, “Entrance of Jews into Hungarian Society,” 287. 
34 Kenez, Coming of the Holocaust, 15. 
35 Ibid., 16. 
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likely to urbanize with the growth of such places as Vienna and Budapest, pre-positioning 
themselves both intellectually and geographically for new opportunities.36 
In the early modern period, Jews established a niche for themselves as money 
handlers for Christian leaders who were forbidden to lend money at a profit.37 Jews also 
served as tax collectors for the monarchs and rent collectors for the nobles; this 
arrangement provided an intermediary between the rulers and the peasants. 
Unfortunately, the collectors became the face of the financial hardship of the transition to 
absolutist (and ultimately modern) governance; the peasants projected their disdain, once 
again, on the Jews. Meanwhile, the rulers padded their treasury not only from the taxes 
collected by the Jews but also from them in terms of a tolerance tax.38 
Finally, the Jews developed a strong sense of community as a result of continued 
persecution as well as out of religious obligation. Their ties of kinship extended past state 
boundaries, developing international coreligionist identities that often trumped their 
national identities, particularly in Eastern Europe, where nationalism developed more 
slowly and tendentiously.39  “This sense of belonging,” writes Kenez, “of being able to 
trust one another and thereby create international networks, came to be a great advantage 
in the development of modern capitalism.”40 
These silver linings, so to speak, were double-edged in an age of political and 
social upheaval that allowed old hatreds to secure a new basis. With the looming change 
in social structure, unlocked by the Jewish emancipation of the late nineteenth century, 
the European Jewry in general and Hungarian Jewry specifically, were poised for a 
golden age that was doomed to end abruptly. At the same time, according to Kenez, those 
disadvantaged by the tipping of the social and economic scale had a different view of the 
Jews: 
                                                 
36 Jászi, Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, 172–73. 
37 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1951), 11, 16. 
38 Kenez, Coming of the Holocaust, 17. 
39 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 17–18. 
40 Kenez, Coming of the Holocaust, 18. 
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The other side of the coin was how antisemites saw those same Jewish 
characteristics. For them, Talmudic learning was merely an exercise in 
meaningless hair-splitting; Jewish mobility was the same as rootlessness; 
involvement in the banking business was just another name for the 
traditional Jewish ‘vice’ of usury and an unwillingness to engage in 
‘healthy or useful labor;’ and the desire to help fellow Jews was 
clannishness.41 
4. Jews in Hungary: From Golden Age to Scapegoat 
Upon emancipation, the European Jewish population benefited equally from 
middle-class opportunities in the middle of the nineteenth century and later; even in 
Germany, 80 percent of the Jews were considered to be middle class. The crucial 
difference between Hungary and the rest of Europe is that the Hungarian Jewry had a 
near-monopoly on the middle class, as well as a disproportionate amount of its 
accompanying power and prestige. Of course, the prosperity would not last42—the social 
segregation persisted and acquired ominous tendencies.43 
a. The Golden Era: From Ausgleich to World War I 
By the late nineteenth century, the Hungarian Jewry, thanks to a strong birth rate 
and an influx of immigration, had grown from approximately 100,000 at the beginning of 
the century to nearly a million at its close. Hungary was still struggling to fully shed 
some of its outdated social stratifications, which persisted despite the efforts of even such 
notable activists as Louis Kossuth; the emancipated and overwhelmingly acculturated 
Jewish bourgeoisie emerged from the Ausgleich of 1867 into the cultural void between 
the nobles and the multi-ethnic peasants.44  
Jews were climbing the social, economic, and political ladders at unprecedented 
levels. According to Paul Lendvai, “There were 16 Jewish MPs in the parliament in 
Budapest…Baron Samu Hazai became Minister of War, whilst Theodor Herzl’s nephew 
Ferenc Heltai was the Mayor of Budapest. The appointment of Vilmos Vázsonyi, a 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 52; Gildea, Barricades and Borders, 166–7. 
43 Silber, “Entrance of Jews into Hungarian Society,” 285–88. 
44 Berend, History Derailed, 199; Kenez, Coming of the Holocaust, 53. 
 19 
practicing Jew, as Minister of Justice in 1917 completed the symbolic breakthrough for 
the Jews who had become Hungarians.”45 Assimilated Jews were now only visible for 
their triumphs. As a population, they performed well in universities; a disproportionate 
number of the faculty was Jewish. Many were successful in accumulating wealth and 
married into noble families that had lost their fortunes.46 
Their successful assimilation brought about a backlash that its proponents may 
not have expected. The rapid and extensive acculturation of so many Jews created a 
growing sense of apprehension among the resident anti-Semites. To them, Jewishness 
was not a religion but a separate race, an inescapable alien-ness in a belatedly but 
vigorously nationalizing Hungary. By this time, the acculturated and urbanized Jews 
became even more feared and hated than the Orthodox Jews who clung determinedly to 
their otherness; they became an invisible enemy capable of subverting their traditional 
Christian nation,47 a veritable enemy within whose very existence imperiled the national 
project.48 
b. The Interwar Period 
Hungary suffered greatly during the war and was handed an ignominious defeat at 
the Trianon near Paris. The historical events between the two wars are too numerous to 
reproduce here but two in particular deserve attention: The disruptive 1919 communist 
regime of Béla Kun and the Treaty of Trianon, which adumbrated Habsburg Hungary and 
historical Hungary. The former event further engrained the animosity between the Jews 
and non-Jews, while the latter scarred the Hungarian nationalist psyche so indelibly that it 
remains a bitter point of resentment today, as well as a major portion of Jobbik’s 
platform. 
After a short-lived democratic republic at the end of World War I, an even shorter 
communist regime came to power in Hungary. The party was staffed with a 
                                                 
45 Paul Lendvai, Hungary: Between Democracy and Authoritarianism, trans. Keith Chester (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 56. 
46 Kenez, Coming of the Holocaust, 53–60. 
47 Ibid., 62, 290. 
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disproportionate number of Jewish members, although they did not consider themselves 
especially Jewish. What followed is known in Hungary as the Red Terror, as the Jewish 
Béla Kun and his accomplices terrorized property owners and other common bourgeoisie 
targets— Jews and non-Jews suffered alike, though the revolution was and is commonly 
seen as a Jewish-led Bolshevik revolt. A mixture of forces put down the Bolshevik 
revolution; chief among them was a group of extreme-right young men from Szeged. 
These counterrevolutionaries were well known for their anti-Semitic ideology,49 and the 
so-called White Terror that followed the fall of the communist regime in August 1919 
was “directed with special ferocity against Jews of all political persuasions or none at 
all….”50 The year 1920 saw the passage of a numerus clausus law “that heavily restricted 
the entry of Jewish students into the country’s universities to the 6 percent held to be the 
Jewish proportion of the population at the time.”51 The new and embittered Hungarian 
nation seemed determined to reconstruct itself without Hungary’s Jews. 
The Treaty of Trianon was signed at Versailles on June 4, 1920. By the terms of 
this pact, Hungary lost 71 percent of its territory to its surrounding neighbors—mostly 
going to Czechoslovakia and Romania—and 64 percent of its population. The loss of 
power, prestige, natural resources, and wealth can hardly be overstated. Trianon and its 
aftermath also precipitated the final devastations of what was left of the relationship 
between the Jewry and the Hungarian nationalists. Until now, the Jews had been valuable 
allies to the ethnic Hungarian nationalists. Together, they formed an effective coalition in 
maintaining order among the remaining minorities in Hungary. The result of Trianon was 
a near-homogeneous Hungarian population.  
The only use the nationalists had for the Jews was to replace their recently 
departed bogey, the non-Magyar minorities.52 Perhaps the most striking example of this 
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new animosity—and the determination to delegitimize the Jewish presence in Hungary 
altogether—was the passage in June 1938 of the omnibus Law for the More Efficient 
Protection of the Social and Economic Balance, which sought to cap Jewish involvement 
in industry, commerce, banking, medicine, the law, and entertainment. “Henceforth, no 
more than 20 percent of the workforce in any given enterprise was to be of Jewish 
origin.”53 
In sum, the interwar period created the conditions that led to the violent, anti-
Jewish excesses of the war years—and afterwards. The Revolution gave ammunition to 
those who believed the Jews wanted to take over the government of Hungary and would 
use violence to accomplish it. The Treaty of Trianon removed the usefulness of the 
Jewish nationalists as a loyal counterbalance to the non-Magyar minorities. By the time 
that Hungary marched into fascism, together with Admiral Horthy’s November 1919 
march into Budapest, the country’s anti-Semitism had already undone a century or more 
of the Hungarian-Jewish experience. 
B. HUNGARY’S FASCIST PAST: WILL IT BE JOBBIK’S FUTURE? 
A discussion of Hungary’s fascist past and whether it has a future with Jobbik 
requires a cursory discussion on the general topic of fascism. Numberless authors and 
historians have attempted to define fascism. The number of definitions outstrips the 
individual attempts to define it; no one author agrees with another’s definition, and some 
authors cannot tie themselves to one answer. In many cases, a simple definition cannot 
even be reached; Roger Griffin lists 10 features that may apply to a fascist movement, 
ranging from anti-liberal to anti-conservative.54 Not to be outdone, Stanley Payne lists 13 
characteristics, adding considerations for the exaltation of youth and its emphasis on 
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symbols, to name a few.55 Robert Paxton makes a valiant effort at a concise definition: 
“Fascism is a system of political authority and social order intended to reinforce the 
unity, energy, and purity of communities in which liberal democracy stands accused of 
producing division and decline.”56 He cannot, however, leave it so simply. Paxton argues 
that because of fascism’s amorphous nature, it must be observed in motion—as if to 
imply that fascism cannot be accurately defined, but “[We] know it when [we] see it.”57 
The sources do agree, however, that Hungary saw quite a bit of fascism. 
1. Far-right and Fascist Groups Emerge 
By the 1930s, three major anti-liberal nationalist groups had formed in Hungary. 
It must be emphasized that the groups were not necessarily the cause of the evident 
increase in ultra-nationalism and anti-Semitism; rather, they were the product of a long-
latent racism, encouraged by rapidly deteriorating economic and political conditions. The 
amputation of nearly two-thirds of Hungarian territory resulted in a sizeable influx of 
displaced middle class and lower-ranking nobility. The incoming native Hungarians 
found that they were forced to compete with the resident Jewish middle class for a 
shrinking number of jobs. Further, resentment caused by the Bolshevik revolution was 
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still fresh in their memory. The perception that Jews were attempting to take over their 
government, combined with the dominant position Jews still held in business and 
education, played perfectly into a spreading Jewish narrative. The dubious tract, entitled 
the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, implanted diabolical conspiracy theories of Jewish 
plans for global domination.58 
The young Szeged counterrevolutionaries, prominent in the overthrow of the 
short-lived communist regime and led by Major Gyula Gömbös, formed the first group of 
anti-liberal nationalists in the 1930s. The Party of Racial Defense showed early 
characteristics of fascism but was more prone to support authoritarian control via the 
army. Gömbös was eventually installed in the Admiral Horthy’s cabinet, first as Defense 
Minister, then as Prime Minister. Either Gömbös was tempered by Horthy’s moderation 
or he recognized the government’s reliance on the powerfully placed Jews—after his 
appointment, Gömbös disbanded his party.59 
The new prime minister may have been forced to abandon his more flagrant 
attacks against the Jews but he now had powerful legislative tools at his disposal. J. Erös 
reveals that “[t]he records of the cabinet meetings and the official papers of the Gömbös 
era show pathetic and dangerous attempts by the Hungarian leaders, including Horthy 
himself, to reinterpret fashionable racialism in an innocuous and ‘positive’ way.”60 The 
Prime Minister also created a political militia and a youth organization in true Nazi 
fashion. Gömbös died in 1936, and a string of prime ministers filled his vacancy. 
Gömbös may not have lived to see a fascist Hungarian government but he laid the 
foundation for others to build upon.61 
László Baky led the second group, The Hungarian National Socialist Party, and 
was involved in the earliest stages of Hungarian fascism and the darkest side of the 
counterrevolution. According to Erös, “[László] Baky had been a leading terrorist at 
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Horthy’s headquarters…in 1919.”62 This operational experience was unfortunately 
brought to bear against the Jews during the forthcoming German occupation. After 
Baky’s violent activities during the 1919 counterrevolution, he was posted to a leadership 
position within the Hungarian gendarmerie followed by his entrance into politics. While 
in office, Baky maintained his connections with the gendarmerie officers while 
simultaneously developing a relationship with Berlin, specifically with Heinrich 
Himmler.63 
Following the German occupation in 1944, Baky and a co-conspirator, László 
Endre were appointed by the Minister of the Interior, Döme Sztójay, to act as the local 
leaders for the upcoming holocaust. Where Germany had dictated extermination plans for 
Western European countries, in Hungary they worked hand-in-hand with the two Lászlós. 
“The German role in the destruction of Hungarian Jewry,” observes Kenez, “is best 
understood as giving an opportunity to some determined antisemites to carry out a policy 
that they had long desired and planned.”64 The Hungarian historian György Ránky 
observed: 
The uniqueness of the German occupation in Hungary was that they left a 
relatively large part of National Sovereignty in the hands of the Sztójay 
regime—more than anywhere else in Europe, including Denmark…The 
gendarmerie willingly took upon itself to organize the deportations, with 
the direct or indirect help of the administration.65 
In the space of less than two months, Baky, along with his loyal gendarmerie, deported 
434,351 Jews on 147 trains—most of which arrived at Auschwitz and were immediately 
gassed.66 
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Finally, there was the Arrow Cross party, led by Ferenc Szálasi. Szálasi was a 
mixed-heritage Hungarian nationalist who served on the general staff. Unlike most of his 
extra-national contemporaries, notes Payne, “Szálasi was a man of limited talents, skilled 
neither as an orator nor as a journalist.”67 The would-be Führer started several national 
socialist parties in an attempt to gain parliamentary representation. While both the right-
leaning regent and prime minister were openly anti-Semitic, they had no desire to allow a 
fascist revolution. Horthy and his government dissolved Szálasi’s party and sent him to 
jail, but they could not curb his growing popularity. Szálasi’s new national socialist party 
eventually merged with eight other similar parties, forming what became the Arrow 
Cross Party. Through a series of elections and coalitions, the Arrow Cross Party managed 
to garner 49 parliament seats, roughly 25 percent of the popular vote. Although it was far 
from unseating the Government Party’s majority, with 179 seats, the Arrow Cross party 
had established itself as a truly powerful political force.68  
2. Fascism’s Violent Last Gasp 
In October of 1944, Horthy attempted to free his country from the control of his 
one-time ally. The regent bumbled through an ill-conceived coup, which resulted in its 
failure and his arrest. Horthy was forced to abdicate his rule and name Szálasi as his 
replacement. Though politically popular, Szálasi had proven to be less than competent, 
which probably played into the designs of the occupiers. At this point, it was clear that 
the Germans had lost the war, but they still had no problems finding willing 
collaborators. It is likely that the Hungarian henchmen understood that they only had a 
limited time to complete the national cleansing process.69 
With full control over the government, Szálasi could implement his desires 
unchecked. Kenez notes sadly: “The anarchic situation gave opportunities to people to 
live out their sadistic fantasies.”70 The Hungarian gendarmerie conducted Jewish prisoner 
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marches of such a harsh nature that death could have been the only expected outcome. 
Prisoners froze, starved, or marched until they dropped, then were quickly shot. The 
brutality of the marches was such that a German SS officer later remarked on the 
brutality of the Hungarians.71 
The Red Army liberated Budapest in January of 1945. In three short months, the 
Arrow Cross Party had murdered an estimated 50,000 Jews in Budapest—and an 
unknown number throughout the countryside. For Hungary, the war was over. The 
flirtation with fascism had failed, climaxing with approximately 94 days of murderous 
rampage. One occupier took the place of the other and the war between “us” and “them” 
went back underground. Sadly, this failed dream of re-creating the proud Magyar 
Fatherland came at the price of an estimated 570,000 Hungarian Jews.72 
C. CONCLUSION: THE FRUITS OF AN UNADDRESSED PAST 
Anti-Semitism and the nationalist sentiments that fed fascism in Hungary were 
never dealt with after the Russian invasion—they entered an uneasy hibernation. Jobbik 
has not created a new version of otherness and fear, but merely resurrected antiquated 
visions of outsiders occupying powerful economic and cultural positions. Jobbik’s 
struggle to obtain increased political power is not so much to restore economic prosperity 
to Hungary, as it is to recreate a homogeneous Fatherland—a Hungary for Hungarians. 
Hungary has had many anti-Semitic and nationalist parties, yet only a very few 
pursued the path toward fascism. Few except Jobbik will deny that it is anti-Semitic, but 
determining whether Jobbik is fascist or not is much more problematic. Paxton 
acknowledges that the term “fascist” has lost some of its meaning for its overuse.73 What 
truly matters is whether Jobbik intends to take up the standard where Szálasi and Baky  
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dropped it. Will Jobbik revisit totalitarian methods to recreate a Hungary free of 
outsiders? Observers may differ on their predictions, but one thing is for sure: Like 
Paxton, they’ll know it when they see it. 
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III. JOBBIK: “A MOVEMENT FOR A BETTER HUNGARY”74 
Ultra-nationalist movements have found an accommodating home in Europe, 
especially a Europe shaken by the ill effects of globalization and the 2007 crisis; they 
range from skinhead motorcycle clubs content with beating up neighborhood minorities 
to National Socialist parties seeking to establish their conception of a Fourth Reich on the 
wreckage of social market pluralism of the post-1945 and post-1989 variety. Fringe 
groups on either side of the spectrum are readily discounted, marked as unwilling or 
unable truly to establish themselves as anything more than rabble-rousers.  Closer to the 
center of the spectrum—or, more aptly, nipping at the heels of the old big-tent parties of 
the postwar period—however, several European political movements have gained 
momentum and relative legitimacy in democratic political culture. Careful consideration 
of these organizations reveals not only that Jobbik is one of many right-wing movements 
in Europe, but also that it is different in ways of aims and means that cannot be 
discounted. Jobbik’s variation of extremism cannot be lumped in with it contemporaries; 
Jobbik defies the comfortable, preconceived notions of the West, its deep-seated hatred 
cloaked behind the noble-seeming veil of integral nationalism and honor as a contrast 
with the dishonor and cosmopolitanism of the EU. 
A. JOBBIK: NOT YOUR FATHER’S FASCISM 
In a study of right-wing extremism in Europe, Hans-Georg Betz describes the 
radical right-wing movements as belonging to one of two distinct camps: national 
populist parties or neo-liberal populist parties. Betz characterizes the former as a party 
that “Tend[s] to appeal to voters with lower level of education, working-class status, from 
areas characterized by a lower quality of life … Emphasiz[ing] law and order, traditional 
moral values, and radical opposition to immigrants and refugees.”75 The latter, neo-
liberal party, “Tend[s] to appeal to voters with higher level education and mixed social 
status,” stressing “individualism and a market-oriented liberalism while placing less 
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emphasis on immigration.”76 Jobbik is an interesting mix of these characterizations; 
clearly it is a nationalist party, yet it defies the expectation of a less-educated 
constituency. While Jobbik does attract voters from the blue-collar population segment, 
its roots are in academia, and 22 percent of its online supporters have university 
degrees.77 Similarly, Jobbik’s educated voting bloc defies the pro-capitalist policy norms 
established by other parties with similarly educated constituencies. Italy’s Lega Nord and 
Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) seek a government based on market-oriented liberalism, 
while Jobbik is calling for the nationalization of natural resources, banking, 
transportation, and retirement pensions.78 
Jobbik’s motivations and goals do not line up nicely with its contemporaries but 
veer off down unexpected paths. Its scapegoats are not newly arriving immigrants, but 
populations that have lived within its borders for centuries. Jobbik’s potential allies are 
not other right-wing Christian parties in Europe, but Islamic autocracies in the Middle 
East and Hungary’s former occupier, the former Soviet Union. If one is to understand 
Jobbik, one must account for its uniqueness; Jobbik cannot be lumped in with other right-
wing extremism movements.  
B. JOBBIK’S BEGINNINGS: “US” VERSUS “THEM” 
Jobbik is unquestionably a representation of the far right in Europe but it is not a 
typical xenophobic motorcycle gang; members do not sport shaved heads or gather on 
street corners dressed in biker jackets, carrying clubs. Rather, Jobbik is a powerful 
political party, with members serving on the European Council and in the Hungarian 
parliament. Its representatives and constituents include retired professionals, 
distinguished academics, passionate students, and dedicated laborers.  
Jobbik’s constituents do not equally support every plank of the party’s platform—
many seem to support the party’s agenda in an à la carte fashion. Some voters are not 
interested in Jobbik’s anti-Semitism but are in favor of the party’s anti-EU or domestic 
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economic policies. The common thread among these voters is the antiestablishment vote. 
Many Hungarian voters see past governments’ corruption as the cause of the current 
economic difficulties. They view increased Europeanization as the cultural and economic 
sellout of their homeland and are eager to give some other party a chance. Even those 
who may not be completely convinced of Jobbik’s ability or motives are so disenchanted 
with the previous governments that they will vote for any other party in protest.  
Another key distinction between Jobbik and other ultra-nationalist European 
groups is the demographic make-up of the membership. Jobbik has attracted scores of 
educated, successful people to its cause; Krisztina Morzai, a former Fulbright scholar, 
published associate professor, and human-rights lawyer, represents Jobbik in the 
European Parliament.79 Morzai was also Jobbik’s presidential nominee for the 2010 
elections.80 
Jobbik, the third-largest political party in Hungary, comes from humble 
beginnings—though with solid right-of-center bona-fides. In 2002, Jobboldali Ifjúsági 
Közösség (Right-Wing Youth Association, or Jobbik), a conservative student 
organization, was formed in ELTE (Eötvös Loránd University), a prestigious Budapest 
university. The founders had grown up under the final years of Hungarian communism 
and witnessed first-hand the initial optimism of the Hungarian transition to democracy 
after 1989; they also experienced disappointment and frustration as their government 
failed to deliver the perceived blessings of a capitalist economy and democratic society in 
the course of the 1990s.81 
The Jobbik leaders viewed the ruling Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) as a 
holdover from the Communist Party and the primary source of the country’s lingering 
(and new) economic and societal woes. On the other hand, they saw potential in 
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supporting Fidesz [Alliance of Young Democrats] as a means of achieving their political 
hopes for Hungary. Like Jobbik, Fidesz was founded by young idealists and realized 
early success as opposition to the MSZP. Lili Török notes, “The goal [of the student 
organization] was to create a space for discussing right-wing issues of identity and 
politics, and to work towards keeping ‘communists’ out of power and ensuring Fidesz’s 
victory at the next elections.”82 Initially, Jobbik offered its services and supporters to any 
conservative party but held no political ambitions of its own. In the beginning, it was 
content to help unite conservative efforts against the left.83 
Then in the Hungarian parliamentary elections of 2002, the conservative parties, 
led by Fidesz, lost the controlling share of the government in a close election to the 
resurgent MSZP. While Fidesz voiced its disappointment with a muted call for a recount, 
Jobbik’s young supporters took the demand for a do-over a significant step further, taking 
to the streets in a violent clash with police. The agitations for a recount failed, MSZP 
retained parliamentary control, and the ties that bound Jobbik with Fidesz and the other 
Hungarian conservative parties were severed by distrust and the perception of 
abandonment. Jobbik now viewed Fidesz as part of the Western-style democratic 
establishment, which made the party part of the problem that politics-as-usual could not 
remedy.  
Jobbik decided to enter the political ring under its own power, graduating from its 
accustomed approach of agitation and mere demonstration. Fox and Vermeersch note that 
“Jobbik…bucked [the] trend by consistently (and successfully) seeking political office … 
In contrast to other extremist groupings, Jobbik has planned its attack of the 
establishment from the inside, but unlike [other extreme parties] before it, without 
diluting its extremism.”84 Jobbik initially had little political success as it tried in vain to 
pair itself with other radical movements in Hungary—for example, the Hungarian Truth 
and Life Party (MIÉP) and the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement. MIÉP eventually 
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agreed to soften its rhetoric as international pressures mounted prior to Hungary joining 
the EU. Jobbik’s determination to incorporate its unadulterated extremist views into 
mainstream politics is the very trait that separated it from its contemporaries—within 
Hungary and throughout Europe. Jobbik was determined to create a political platform, 
one that was unashamed to highlight the perceived Roma problem, the foreign Zionists 
buying up their homeland, and the crippling results of Western-style democracy and its 
economic pillage to fatten the powerful countries of the EU.85 
Jobbik’s earliest leadership was more interested in dealing with the onset of 
economic troubles and resisting Hungary’s impending accession to the European Union. 
A few powerful politicians made monumental decisions regarding the future of Hungary 
with little effort given to explain the decisions and the resultant economic 
accommodations. In the view of a traditionally nationalist stronghold, the established 
political bureaucracy was content to hand the keys to the Hungarian kingdom to the 
West. This scenario fed into a growing narrative that the far right was only too happy to 
highlight. Kovács distills the fears of many Hungarians in a way that speaks to many 
smaller nations’ struggle with the double-edged sword of EU enlargement:  
The tensions caused by economic and cultural globalization were 
portrayed as a conflict between cosmopolitan and national interests, 
joining international integration as a loss of national sovereignty, and the 
social consequences of the economic and political transition as the result 
of being at the mercy of colonial masters.86 
Historically, Hungary has endured domination and invasion on a dramatic scale; 
the Ottomans, the Habsburgs, the Entente, Nazis, and Soviets all left their mark on the 
collective Magyar psyche. This generally accepted national identity justifies a hesitancy 
to relinquish any amount of autonomy to international entities. Jobbik was quick to 
protest the EU enlargement proposition and include it as a plank in its party platform; it 
remains a foundational tenet to this day.87 
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Jobbik’s timing, as much as its message, resonated within Hungary’s unique 
political demographics. András Kovács observes that some 33 percent of Hungarian 
voters demonstrate no allegiance to any particular party, but “[tend] to migrate between 
the extremes on the political spectrum.”88 Kovács also notes a possible commonality in 
this block of voters, in that they appear to be “losers in the transition,”89 having lost their 
former status along with their chance at upward mobility. This disaffection of a large 
body of voters is compounded by a palpable distrust in public institutions, resulting in a 
clear anti-establishment voting tendency. Absent a comparable party on the left, Jobbik 
was able to gather many of these voters, merely as an avenue for the voters to voice their 
displeasure against the established parties.90 
Jobbik has captured many voters who feel that the establishment has lost is way 
and become immobilized in the entanglements of corruption and international interests, 
but it is more than just capturing disillusioned voters. Jobbik has drawn clear distinctions 
between itself and its political competition. Jobbik’s platform is more than just honesty 
and transparency; it is a return to a Hungary of the past, a powerful nation that could 
stand independent of others, both international meddlers and internal “others.” To Jobbik, 
“us” versus “them” will always be both an internal and external battle. 
C. THE ROMA: AN INVASION FROM WITHIN 
Jobbik quickly seized on another opportunity to expand it voting base with its 
exclusive focus on “Gypsy crime.” In its 2010 election manifesto, Jobbik described the 
Roma (Gypsy) issue: “The continuation of the Gypsy people’s circumstances along their 
current course is nothing short of a potential time-bomb, and if it is not subject to 
concerted intervention, our mutual home could sink into a state of virtual civil war.”91 
Although a significant population of Roma has lived in Hungary since the 
fourteenth century, they are still considered “other” and therefore not Hungarian. From 
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their earliest arrival, they lived on the outskirts of Hungarian society, relegated to second-
class citizenship and the restrictions associated with it. Discrimination against the 
Hungarian Roma was officially instituted in the eighteenth century as the Hungarian 
monarchs established measures in an attempt to eradicate them from their kingdom. 
Roma children were relocated to Hungarian families; their language, clothing, and 
customs were outlawed. These discriminatory measures were ultimately undone by the 
kingdom’s need for cheap labor. While economic necessity forced the end of official 
discrimination, the Roma have been forced to live in roughly the same social and 
economic situations since the eighteenth century.92 
The Roma are arguably Hungary’s greatest “losers” in the transition to 
democracy. Under communism, they were guaranteed an education, a job, and a place to 
live. Now, none of that is guaranteed, and for the Roma, neither is it likely. Presently, in 
some Roma communities, the unemployment rate reaches between 80 percent and 90 
percent, while in 60 percent of households there is no income other than welfare.93 
Education, often seen as the gateway to employment, is similarly absent from 
most Roma families; 88 percent of the general population have never attended 
kindergarten and those who make it to school are twice as likely as their native 
Hungarian counterparts to be placed in schools for children with mental disabilities. 
Roma communities remain as they were under the Austro-Hungarian Empire: on the 
outskirts of Hungarian communities, often lacking paved roads, electricity and indoor 
plumbing. It is little wonder that under such oppressive circumstances and deprivation 
that Roma turn to crime in order to survive.94 
The Roma issue is not restricted to Hungary; in 2010, French President Sarkozy 
introduced security legislation that forced large groups of Roma from France; the Roma 
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in Italy face discrimination in terms of housing, education, and employment.95 Jobbik, 
however, has showcased its vitriol of the Roma, making it one of the most prominent 
campaign issues. Jobbik has garnered significant political power due to successive ruling 
parties’ unwillingness or inability to address the Roma issue in any meaningful way. By 
the late 1990s, the EU was considering extending membership to several Eastern 
European countries. Aside from assessing the status of potential member states’ 
economies, the EU was also gauging their human rights policies. While the economic and 
social situation of the Hungarian Roma was deteriorating at a rapid pace, the established 
political parties were unwilling to address the rising tide of unrest toward the Roma 
problem.96 
Jobbik has championed the majority’s angst against the minority Roma. Jobbik 
acknowledges the difficult position of the Roma but then accuses them of exacerbating 
their own plight through laziness: “At the present time a segment of the Gypsy 
community strive for neither integration, nor employment, nor education; and wish only 
that society maintain them through the unconditional provision of state benefits.”97 
Jobbik offers the Roma community a carrot in the form of soliciting integration and 
education assistance from religions and civic institutions, all while holding the stick of a 
newly formed gendarmerie over their heads. This political militia, or Hungarian Guard, 
has repeatedly shown up to “keep the peace” in Roma communities. Jobbik, it seems, 
would prefer to take a page from history’s playbook, after all, segregation or elimination 
is much cheaper and easier than integration.98 
Jobbik’s proactive recommendations and show of force in Roma communities 
give the party dominant ownership of the issue—and a significant pull on the loyalty of 
voters. Karácsony and Róna’s distillation of a 2009 Hungarian electoral study highlights 
that, regarding a survey sample, 25 percent of the total Hungarian population agree that 
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“the growth in the Roma population threatens the security of the society,”99 and a 
stunning 38 percent responded to the same question with an “absolutely agree.”100 A 
slightly smaller percentage agreed that the tendency for Roma to commit crime was 
genetically inherited.101 
The solution to the Roma issue, however, may be more awful than the problem to 
be solved. While the English version of Jobbik’s manifesto speaks of the need to 
rehabilitate and assimilate the Roma, the much lengthier Hungarian version introduces 
the possibility of an additional solution. Jobbik promises, “to strengthen the Gypsy youth 
education, either through integration or segregation.” 102 The threat of segregation is of 
concern to any who value civil rights, but it carries a deeper and darker connotation in a 
country still haunted by its history with the holocaust. Established ghettos supplying 
separate services and accommodations to European minorities should send a shiver up the 
collective Western spine.  
Few argue that Jobbik is not serious about the Roma issue, but some see it merely 
as a means to an end, as a convenient vehicle to distance themselves from the established 
parties. Despite the persistent and growing issues associated with the Roma population, 
successive, post-communist governments have not committed to undertake any 
meaningful action to address the issues. Jobbik has aggressively addressed the Roma 
issue, and effectively established itself as an anti-establishment party, one that will solve 
problems that others have ignored for decades.  
D. THE HUNGARIAN JEWRY: THE INVASION FROM WITHOUT 
Jobbik gains most of its domestic support for its hardline stance against Roma the 
Roma, but it gains most of its international notoriety with its anti-Semitic rhetoric. In its 
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manifestos, Jobbik is careful not to mention Jews, Israel, or Zionism, but it is quite 
obvious to Kovács and others that Jobbik has singled out the Jewish people, as a 
“colonizing … investor, as a media shark or as a former Jewish-communist functionary 
morphed into a Hungarian capitalist.”103 Kovács goes on to argue that, unlike the Roma 
issue, “the anti-Semitism of the extreme right has not been transformed into a political 
ideology; it does not take on the form of anti-Jewish political demands.”104 Instead, 
continues Kovács, “the anti-Semitic language currently serves primarily as a medium for 
establishing extreme right-wing identity, which can then be used to reveal, in the sense of 
Carl Schmitt, ‘our kind’ and ‘your kind.’”105 Here, Kovács’s argument encounters some 
difficulties. It is possible that Jobbik is fomenting racial tensions between non-Jewish 
Hungarians and Jews in order to solidify Jobbik’s radical identity. Perhaps Hungary’s 
sustained undercurrent of anti-Semitism is a useful vehicle to establish Jobbik as a clear 
choice for those who believe that Hungary should be for the Hungarians, but it seems that 
the party’s act is a little too convincing.  
Kovács writes that “Jobbik has redefined traditional political cleavages. Instead of 
the traditional left-right divide, it set the new political frontline between the ‘Old’ and 
‘New’, representing the ‘Global’ and the ‘National.’”106 Jobbik argues that all of 
Hungary’s problems—be they social, economic or political—were caused by the old 
guard, leftover communists and their stooges, determined to auction off the nation to 
satisfy the desires of the West. If Jobbik can successfully sell this vision to a sufficient 
number of voters, if it can portray itself as the sole guardian of the Hungarian nation and 
of nations in general, it will have obtained license to act against those it has clearly 
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collectivity: those who speak it belong to ‘Us,’ to ‘real Hungarians,’ as opposed to those 
who represent the continuity of the former communist and the present ‘colonialist’ 
exploitation.”107 
In November of 2012, Márton Gyöngyösi, Jobbik’s deputy for foreign relations, 
said the following during a parliamentary meeting, “It is high time to assess many MPs 
and government members are of Jewish origin and who present a national security risk to 
Hungary.”108 Gyöngyösi later walked the comment back, saying that he intended it to 
apply only to those MPs and government members with dual citizenship, but both the 
comment and its supposed contextual meaning were grossly inappropriate, and the 
damage was done. In 2009, Krisztina Morvai, Jobbik’s 2010 presidential nominee and 
one of Hungary’s current representatives to the European Commission, addressed 
Israelis, saying: “I wish all of you lice-infested, dirty murderers will receive Hamas’ 
kisses.”109 Additionally, Morvai stated she “would be glad if the so-called proud 
Hungarian Jews would go back to playing with their tiny little circumcised tails rather 
than vilifying [her].”110 
Jobbik, on its official website, attempts to deflect the domestic and international 
charges of anti-Semitism and would downplay individual statements from a grass-roots 
movement of concerned individuals. Instead, it would direct attention to the alleged 
large-scale sale of Hungarian land to Israeli Jews. The party’s claims of foreign 
imperialism were, perhaps inadvertently, given credence when former Israeli president, 
Shimon Peres, said: “Nowadays you can build empires without establishing colonies and 
sending in the army. Israeli businessmen are investing all around the world, enjoying 
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unparalleled success, earning economic independence. We’re buying up Manhattan, 
Poland, Hungary and Romania.”111 Jobbik opponents claim that the far right in Hungary 
has misinterpreted the unfortunate comment, but Jobbik continues to use the comment as 
a means to justify, and perhaps cloak, the more sinister motives behind its anti-Semitic 
policies. 
E. JOBBIK AND ISLAM: NOT WHAT YOU MIGHT EXPECT 
While anti-Muslim sentiments are the calling card of most European nationalist 
movements, Jobbik has touted far and wide its espoused kinship with Palestine, Syria, 
Iran, and other Muslim countries. Jobbik’s affinity for Islam may be explained in Islam’s 
determined traditionalism and hated of modernity. As a means of contrasting Islam 
against the neo-liberal West, Jobbik president, Gábor Vona writes: 
There’s only one culture left which seeks to preserve its traditions: it is the 
Islamic world…I declare that today the [sic] mankind’s last remaining 
bastions of traditional culture—experiencing the transcendent in everyday 
life—is the Islamic world. I say this as a Roman Catholic man…If Islam 
fails the lights will completely go out. There will be no foeman against the 
darkness of globalism. Then the history will really come to an end and 
there will be no happy end.112 
The significance of Jobbik’s views on Islam and the demarcation it represents 
between themselves and other European far-right movements cannot be overlooked—and 
Jobbik’s senior representatives make use of every opportunity to highlight this 
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difference.113 Hungary, however, does not have a significant Muslim population; as of 
the 2011 census, there were 5,579 people who identified themselves of the Islamic faith. 
It is not unreasonable to conclude that Jobbik’s favorable view of Muslims might change 
with a large influx of Muslim immigrants. Jobbik, one might argue, enjoys 
multiculturalism and ethnic diversity from a distance.  
F. JOBBIK’S FOREIGN POLICY: FROM WEST TO EAST 
Jobbik’s ideology may gain its notoriety from its policies regarding the Hungarian 
minorities, but its proposed foreign policy may be cause for concern in the West. Jobbik’s 
entire foreign policy is formed around its core-level distrust of the United States and 
Western Europe. Jobbik’s mistrust goes beyond the common fear that membership in 
international organizations and treaties, such as the EU and NATO, will lead to the 
gradual erosion of national sovereignty, they accuse the West of plundering resources and 
wealth from Hungary in the name of cooperative security and economics. With this, 
Jobbik seems to express the foundational far-right condemnation of U.S. manipulation in 
Europe, either directly or through such international organizations as NATO. While 
Jobbik’s policies against Israel seem overtly anti-Semitic, they serve the dual purpose of 
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flouting U.S. influence within its country.114 In Jobbik’s view, Hungary’s current alliance 
with the West has been more problematic that their former alliance with the Soviet 
Union. 
After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the newly elected Hungarian leadership 
looked to the West to secure economic and strategic alliances. To the consternation of 
Hungarian nationalists, including Jobbik’s future founders, overtures were made toward 
the EU, culminating in membership; Hungary was one of the earlier members of the 
expanding EU. So confident was the Hungarian leadership in the promise of the EU that 
it readily agreed to the required reforms and concessions that came with the membership 
process.  
Hungary’s decision to move forward with EU accession procedures subjected it to 
several requirements, specifically those listed in the June 1993 European Council in 
Copenhagen: 
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning 
market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces within the Union.115 
Jobbik is decidedly anti-capitalist and, at its core, is distrustful of subjection to the 
perceived ravages of the EU’s market forces. The establishment eagerly accepted the 
promises of prosperity offered by the EU and the economic boundaries between Hungary 
and the West were discarded. Jobbik views this to be a colonization effort sponsored by 
Fidesz and the MSZP, one that can only be corrected by Hungary’s departure from the 
Union. 
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In addition to economic requirements, the European Council established the 
requirement for new EU members to abide by human rights and minority protection 
criteria. Those requirements were strengthened in the December 2000 EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: “Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other 
opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation shall be prohibited.”116 By accepting these terms, the opposition government 
had agreed to let the West dictate what “True Hungarians” could and could not do with 
relation to the “others” within their nation. While supporters of Jobbik found the 
restrictions unconscionable, they were handed a position of relative power in upcoming 
elections. All that was left was to fan the flames of ultra-nationalism. 
In the meantime, European business and money flooded into Hungary to such a 
level that it now accounts for 50 percent of Hungary’s national product.117 In spite of—or 
perhaps because of—foreign intervention, the economic transformation has been slow to 
succeed; many Hungarian businesses have suffered as the European market has replaced 
their businesses and products. And while Hungary is not alone in resisting the European 
and even global economies, Jobbik is the only represented party demanding that the 
government withdraw from the EU.118 Vona clearly stated his disdain for EU 
membership and international capitalism in a 2013 interview: 
At the moment, we Hungarians are sick passengers on a sinking European 
ship that has lost its values. This is unbearable. First we must get off the 
ship, then cure our diseases. Hungary was not admitted to the EU so that 
we could develop. The goal was to colonize us, to exploit our cheap labor 
and acquire our markets. Western companies and banks now try to 
maintain their systems by using the profit they pump out of our country in 
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living in the valuelessness of capitalism…I believe that Europe should get 
back to its own roots and rearrange its relationship with other traditional 
cultures that only exist in the East now.119 
Not only has Jobbik publicly called for Hungary’s departure from the EU, but it 
has also devised a replacement with a pivot to the East. By establishing diplomatic and 
economic ties to the East, Jobbik seeks to establish Hungary as a bridgehead between its 
new partners and the European markets. Jobbik has made preliminary overtures for 
economic partnerships with China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and 
Turkey. While Vona has not promised his party or his country to Russian President 
Putin’s Eurasian Union, Russian insiders argue that Hungary is a potential target.120 
Putin argues that this Eurasian Union is not an attempt to revive the Soviet Union; 
however, the strengthening of Russia at the cost of the EU should cause the West to 
reflect upon lessons learned from the cold war. Hungary has not been an economic boon 
to the EU, and likely, was never seriously considered to be, but economic ties between 
strategic partners are cords that hope to prevent international conflict. The European 
community eagerly accepted Hungary to solidify peace in the vacuum of the former 
Warsaw Pact. 
The EU is not the only international alliance to arouse scorn from Jobbik. If 
Jobbik has its way, the relationship between Hungary and NATO may suffer, as well. 
Géza Jeszenszky, Hungary’s former minister of foreign affairs and ambassador to the 
United States, claims that Jobbik has called for Hungary to leave NATO,121 but finding a 
published document or interview that confirms Jeszenszky’s statement has proven 
difficult. What is clear is that Jobbik is seeking a less restrictive relationship with NATO.  
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Jobbik reaffirms that Hungary is a member of NATO, but asserts that its 
membership in the alliance will not force Hungary to abandon its independent interests. 
Furthermore, according to their manifesto, “The creation of foreign military bases [in 
Hungary], and the deployment of Hungarian soldiers for foreign interests do not interest 
us.”122 Jobbik describes the detrimental consequences of NATO visited upon Hungary’s 
native ability to defend itself. This, in Jobbik’s view, necessitates the need to re-
nationalize its homeland and border defense by establishing a 70,000- to 72,000-member 
fighting force. This obvious retreat from the collective defense of NATO cannot help but 
cause concern among the other partners to the Atlantic Alliance.123 
Maintaining a collective defense alliance like NATO can be difficult, especially 
during extended periods of peace or when conflicts are confined to the other side of the 
globe. In such scenarios, voters are more likely to favor politicians who peddle domestic 
spending as opposed to carving out a percentage of their nation’s GDP to an international 
body whose other members are likely thinking the same thing. NATO member states 
historically explore the boundaries of allowable burden shifting within the alliance, 
attempting to justify why they are the only country that pay more than the fair amount 
into the fund. Jobbik’s plans to strengthen Hungary into a militarily self-reliant country 
may be gamesmanship for future NATO budget talks, but it is a game it will have to play 
well if it wishes to remain in the Alliance.124 
The EU and NATO represent modern society’s determination to develop a loose, 
yet binding co-op for the preservation of peace and development of economic stability 
within Europe. This project requires nations to lay portions of their sovereignty and 
traditions (some nations more than others) upon the altar of sacrifice. Jobbik’s foreign 
affairs policy is a clear rebuke of international collectivization and a call for the return to 
the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Hungarian Kingdom was powerful and 
its influence and borders were vastly greater.  
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While the EU may be more interested in deemphasizing the importance of 
member-state borders, Jobbik is in favor of redrawing them, or more accurately replacing 
them with the borders that existed prior to World War I and the resultant Trianon treaty, 
which, to the Hungarian mind, marks the first of the searing foreign-policy traumas of the 
twentieth century.125 The trauma of Trianon played an inescapable role in the rise of 
right-wing extremism after World War I, and its effects are still reverberating in 
Hungarian politics today. Vona expressed the views of his supporters as well as many 
other Hungarians concerning the treaty of Trianon: “What happened … in Versailles … 
was a dictate, whereby the enemies of Hungary decided the fate of our country on the 
basis of lies, manipulated figures and false reports … . For Hungarians Trianon is the 
synonym for an attempt of liquidating the Hungarian nation.”126 
Jobbik’s manifesto stops short of expressing the goal to overturn the treaty but 
instead declares “Jobbik’s political horizons are not defined by the borders of our country 
but by the borders of our nation.”127 Furthermore, Jobbik seeks to establish a “’protective 
power’ status for the motherland vis- -vis Hungarian communities beyond the border, the 
cultural and economic reunification of the Hungarian nation, the granting of Hungarian 
citizenry to every Hungarian.”128 In essence, the manifesto outlines Jobbik’s intentions to 
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reunite the Hungarian nation in every way except redrawing lines on a map. However, 
during a Trianon memorial in 2009 a Jobbik representative to the European Council 
revealed, “Jobbik considers it one of its main targets that ‘the Trianon borders should be 
dropped within a few generations or as soon as possible.’”129 
Border-nation concerns’ were heightened recently as the Hungarian government 
granted opportunities for all ethnic Hungarians to obtain citizenship. Most likely, this 
initiative, while providing political strength for Hungary, will further foment agitation 
among the pockets of ethnic Hungarians in countries such as Slovakia and Romania 
where ethnic relations are already strained. 
With Hungary’s accession into the EU, the international community saw a chance 
for rapprochement between Hungary and its neighbors; however, the EU’s attempts to 
erase the significance of European borders actually exacerbated these international 
tensions. Deemphasized national borders allowed Hungary to create strengthened ties 
with its one-time citizens, against the wishes of Slovakia and Romania. Hungary eagerly, 
and perhaps ironically, supported human rights and the monitoring that accompanied it—
now countries that had marginalized ethnic Hungarian minorities were losing significant 
control over them. The fuzzy borders also aided Hungary in its efforts to lessen the claim 
its neighbors had on their Trianon acquisitions.130 
G. CONCLUSION: GOULASH EXTREMISM 
Jobbik, in less than a decade in the new century, has moved from a student union 
to the third largest party in Hungary. This party is an uncomfortable mash-up of patriotic 
nationalism, bigotry, and racism of the nastiest strain.  
At its surface, Jobbik is just another manifestation of the rising right in Europe in 
the twenty-first century, another band of post-communist losers, unsatisfied with the 
transition from East to West and looking for a minority scapegoat. But Jobbik is different. 
It is different because of the uniqueness of Hungary’s history in the record of Europe. 
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Hungary has experienced occupation for hundreds of years by multiple regimes. In the 
past century, its government has bounced from autocracy, to communism, from fascism 
back to communism and a less than successful experiment with democracy. Hungary was 
carved up after WWI, the devastating loss of “home” and “family” has never been fully 
accepted and the wounds suffered at the hands of the victorious West are still fresh. 
Jobbik supporters do not fit the general paradigm for the far right and those who seek to 
understand them or mollify them must seek new approaches. 
The rising Hungarian generation, which cannot align itself with the supposed 
communist holdovers in the MSZP and the failing government that is Fidesz, have little 
choice but to support Jobbik. While some may hold Jobbik’s views on Jews to be 
outdated, they seem to hold their nose as they pull the voting lever because of their rigid 
and crosscutting stand on Gypsy crime. Jobbik has masterfully, if frightfully, filled an 
empty niche with in Hungarian politics. 
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IV. THE HUNGARIAN GUARD: JOBBIK’S PARAMILITARY 
ARM 
In its historical and geo-political context, Jobbik looks less and less like a 
“classic” fascist party and certainly seems to have no direct intellectual connection to 
Hungary's fascist past. Were its formal statements and proposals—even the more 
controversial stances on the Roma or international organizations and alliances—all there 
was to Jobbik, this political party would not deserve any more attention than most other 
far-right parties that pepper the political landscape of Europe today.  
Where Jobbik distinguishes itself, in an ominous way, is with its own paramilitary 
force, the Hungarian Guard. Indeed, the creation and continued support of the Hungarian 
Guard is Jobbik’s most prominent and inescapable link to Hungary’s darkest chapters of 
the age of total war—and to the politically charged violence of the twentieth century in 
Central Europe. For all but Jobbik supporters, the Hungarian Guard conjures feelings of 
intimidation and violence, not patriotism nor security.  
A. THE HUNGARIAN GUARD: REFLECTIONS OF A SHADOW 
In August of 2007, Jobbik established the Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard) with 
the intent to “prepare youth spiritually and physically for extraordinary situations when it 
might be necessary to mobilise the people,”131 according to the Budapest Times, or as 
Jobbik’s leader, Gábor Vona declared, “to carry out the real change of regime and to 
rescue Hungarians.”132 The initial group counted 56 members as homage to the 
Hungarian revolution against the Soviet Union in 1956, but within a month, an additional 
600 members were added. Current numbers of the Guard are not readily available, but by 
2008 Jobbik leadership reported 1,500 members with 5,000 applications; the addition of 
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nearly 100 new members in 2012 shows that the Hungarian Guard is still growing, albeit 
slowly.133 
The Hungarian Guard is responsible for organizing and participating in 
demonstrations and marches, primarily in towns and villages with a high concentration of 
Roma minorities. Two rural towns, Gyöngyöspata and Tatárszentgyörgy, quickly became 
hotspots for Hungarian Guard marches. While the conflicts remained non-violent, the 
Guard and their supporters reportedly engaged in speech that promoted segregation of the 
Roma from the rest of the population.134 This breach of civil rights led the Hungarian 
courts to disband the Guard in 2008; however, the force has since reemerged as The New 
Hungarian Guard Movement and continue many of its past actions with no discernable 
interference from the government.135 
1. Interwar Party Militias in Italy and Germany 
The Hungarian Guard has drawn comparisons to Benito Mussolini’s Black Shirts, 
the pre-Nazi Freikorps, and Adolf Hitler’s SA and SS—the avant-garde of European 
fascism in the inter war era—and Ferenc Szálasi’s Arrow Cross militia.136 While there 
are no direct lineage between the Hungarian Guard and these fascist militias, the 
similarities are obvious and deserve closer inspection.  
In preparation for his rise to power, Mussolini began to form a private militia 
(Squadristi) between 1919 and 1920. The burgeoning fascist leader drew on the public’s 
fears of Socialists, Communists, and workers’ unions, organizing them into reactionary 
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squads. The Black Shirts, as they were known, came from many walks of life: war 
veterans, peasants, and other laborers. As Mussolini’s influence grew in Italy, he ordered 
each region to establish their own branch of Black Shirts, emphasizing separate vanguard 
organizations for young men. These roughly organized militias were loyal to Mussolini 
and his fascist movement, as opposed to the legitimate Italian government. In 1922, 
Mussolini executed a successful coup d’état, the March on Rome; the Black Shirts 
provided the force to establish Mussolini’s governmental takeover. The Black Shirts were 
soon reorganized as the Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (Volunteer Militia 
for National Security), taking orders solely from Mussolini. The haphazardly organized 
militia was now a legitimate government organization under the new fascist 
government.137 
The formation of similar militias in Germany and Austria coincided with Italy’s 
efforts. The Freikorps, sometimes regarded as the vanguard of the Nazism, were founded 
in 1918 in the immediate wake of defeat. Germany’s defeat in the Great War and the 
resultant Versailles Treaty left their army in shambles and disenchanted with soldiering. 
In its place, the new government and the German Supreme Command created a volunteer 
paramilitary, populated by former soldiers who maintained a love of combat and a 
younger generation who believed that they had missed their opportunity to fight.138 The 
Freikorps were a breeding ground for völkisch, or racist nationalist propaganda, with a 
deep resentment toward Jews, Communists, and democracy.139 With the permission of 
the German Social Democratic party leadership, the Supreme Command used the 
Freikorps to suppress all opposition on the Left, leaving the streets (and canals) of Berlin 
littered with debris and casualties. As the Freikorps men had military training, 
experience, and weapons, their acts were especially violent and oppressive both at home  
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and abroad, a difference that presently became meaningless. In May 1919, the Socialist 
government put a staaop to the Freikorps’ activities, but many of the ex-adventurers 
would join the emerging Nazis in the years to follow.140 
2. The Political Militia in Interwar Hungary 
Closer to home, but slightly different than Mussolini and Hitler’s militias, was the 
Arrow Cross Party’s militia. Ferenc Szálasi succeeded in merging many small fascist 
groups into the largest independent party of its time, but due to his time spent in prison, 
as well as his less-than-full dedication to Jewish extermination, Szálasi began to lose 
control of the Arrow Cross militia. The militia was loosed upon the Hungarian Jews only 
after the occupying German forcibly removed the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Miklós 
Horthy.141 
The common thread that ties the Hungarian Guard to these past militias is their 
association with a party as opposed to a legitimate government. Like the fascist militias 
of the early twentieth century, the group takes its orders from a political party, not the 
established government. The Hungarian Guard, however, is not the recreation of these 
former fascist militias—not yet anyway. Its small membership is a far cry from the 
hundreds of thousands of militia members in the once-mighty Freikorps and Black Shirts; 
it has no discernable military training, and has yet to show overtly violent tendencies. In 
the end, it stretches reason to consider the Hungarian Guard as an equal to the former 
fascist militias, but the geopolitical, historical, and cultural context it lives in demands 
Europe’s attention. 
B. EUROPEAN GENDARMES: A FORCE FOR GOOD 
The Hungarian Guard prefers to think of itself as a nascent gendarmerie that is, 
not as the militia that it is—this hope being fueled by Jobbik’s promise of establishing 
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one.142 To avoid confusing the Guard’s potential options, it is important to illustrate the 
differences between a party sponsored paramilitary unit—such as a militia—and a 
gendarmerie. As demonstrated with the Black Shirts and others, militias are an enforcing 
arm of a single party and defer their allegiance to their party as opposed to their 
established governments. A gendarmerie, however, is an official organ of the state. These 
gendarmes can be difficult to define as most countries employ them in different ways. 
Michiel de Weger notes, “In the broadest definition, all military organisations with some 
policing tasks can be regarded as a ‘gendarmerie.’”143 Gendarmes are quite common in 
Europe, particularly among Mediterranean states, but also in the Habsburg lands and even 
in present day Austria and from a European perspective, they are seen as a practical 
option for securing peace and order within their nations and communities. Gendarmes 
have a rich history, dating back to nineteenth-century France, were they remain in force 
today.144  
Contemporary gendarmes differ slightly from their more militant predecessors. 
Some countries have softened their gendarmes’ overtly military characteristics, severing 
official links to their countries’ armed forces, while others maintain their gendarmes 
within their ministry of defense.145 Some countries continue to use gendarmes in foreign 
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conflicts, training them in advanced combat tactics and weapon system.146 In the wake of 
NATO enlargement, such gendarmerie units are now employed in positions and 
operations that other countries, like the United States, reserve for their National Guard. 
The Romanian gendarmerie, as it has evolved since 1989, is an excellent example of how 
gendarmeries can bridge the gap between a military and a domestic police entity. The 
Romanian Gendarmerie has deployed six contingents to Kosovo in support of the United 
Nations and the EU’s Common Support and Defense Policy while retaining their 
domestic mission of large-scale disturbance response and anti-terrorism actions.147 
C. THE NEW GUARD AND THE OLD GENDARMERIE: AN 
UNSHAKEABLE LINK 
With a lengthy and distinguished history, the European gendarmes have proven 
themselves to be a valuable tool for security—from the community to the international 
levels. The Hungarian Guard, however, has not been greeted with any level of 
international acceptance, as most observers cannot separate the Hungarian Guard of today 
from the Hungarian Gendarmerie of its fascist past.148 The Hungarian Gendarmerie’s role 
in the Hungarian Holocaust was addressed in the preceding chapter, but it bears 
recounting that Nazi Germany’s Adolf Eichmann brought only 200 men with him to 
oversee the deportation of over 430,000 Hungarian Jews in less than two months. This 
SS/SD was typical, however, of how the SS and Gestapo relied on police forces to do 
their work for them, be it in the Reich or in Nazi Europe.  The grim work fell mainly to 
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the local gendarmerie, which was all too happy to conduct it with little supervision.149 
With the end of World War II came the Soviet occupation and new methods for ensuring 
the peace and compliance of the population—in 1945, the Hungarian Gendarmerie was 
dissolved. 
1. The Hungarian Guard: An Aggressive Neighborhood Watch?  
Despite the international perception of the Hungarian Guard, opinions vary 
domestically. Outside of the Hungarian capital, the Guard is seen by many as a 
neighborhood watch program, a necessary measure to keep “Gypsy crime” in check. 
There is no military-style training, or any training for that matter, only an expectation that 
they will show up when and where they are needed. Vona has wisely placed uniformed 
guard members in front of the cameras during community service opportunities. In 2008 
and 2013, uniformed Hungarian Guard members labored diligently, filling sandbags to 
hold off floodwaters as the Danube River threatened their communities.150 
Vona maintains that the Guard is a positive force and has not been involved in 
any criminal activity, attempting to separate the Guard from its World War II-era roots. 
Chilling similarities, however, remain between the past and present uniforms and 
symbols. The Hungarian Guard wears a traditional peasant costume of black and white 
emblazoned with the red-and-white–striped flag of Árpád, the Magyar conqueror of the 
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is also an undeniable link to its use by the Arrow Cross; their peasant-styled uniforms 
hearkening to the Brown and Black Shirts of past fascist movements.151 
LeBor surmises that the Guard’s actions are held in check to support Vona’s 
protestations that Jobbik is a non-violent organization, a vital argument to support 
Jobbik’s political legitimacy.152 Observers’ skepticism regarding Jobbik’s position of 
nonviolence was rewarded when a regional Jobbik leader suggested that when Jobbik 
assumes power in Hungary, according to a Hungarian news site, the Hungarian Guard 
would become the backbone of a new gendarmerie, “carrying weapons at their side.”153 
The Hungarian Guard has been one of Jobbik’s greatest avenues for publicity and 
voter recruitment; it has allowed Jobbik to emphasize its proactive programs against the 
perceived “others” and has placed its political platform on the national and international 
stage. The Guard, however, has not come without a price; whether they participate in a 
growing list of hate crimes or not, they are linked by association and are painted with the 
same violent brush. 
                                                 
151 LeBor, “Marching Back to the Future,” 34. Jobbik’s English language website provides it own 
rational for the uniform of the Hungarian Guard and its symbology: 
Journalists for example who see a picture of a person in a white top and black waistcoat, 
and say, that what they in fact see is a blackshirt. When anyone will tell you that a white 
shirt and black waistcoat has been traditional peasant formal attire in Hungary for 
centuries and has never been the uniform of anybody. When dark comments are made 
about “fascist” paraphernalia or symbols “reminiscent” of the 1940s what is being 
referred to, and why are these references always so vague? Simply, because any 
clarification would rapidly dismiss such fear mongering as drivel. The Flag of the Royal 
House of Árpád…has been a symbol of the Hungarian nation, everywhere, for over 800 
years. Precisely because it was, and has for centuries been–everywhere–it was also used 
briefly and in bastardized form, by a tyrannical four month long government in Hungary 
complicit in the holocaust. But neither Jobbik nor the Hungarian Guard ‘resurrected’ this 
symbol, because it has continued to be used as the emblem of government departments, 
rural municipalities, and parliamentary banners, for decades in post-War Hungary, long 
before Jobbik or the Hungarian Guard even existed. Jobbik, “Frequently Refuted Lies,” 
Jobbik: The Movement for a Better Hungary, May 3, 2011, 
http://www.jobbik.com/frequently_refuted_lies. 
152 LeBor, “Marching Back to the Future,” 38. 
153 “Tüntetés Sarkadon: Fegyvert Adna a Gárdának a Jobbik,” BEOL, March 1, 2009, 
http://www.beol.hu/bekes/kozelet/tuntetes-sarkadon-fegyvert-adna-a-gardanak-a-jobbik-215811. 
 57 
2. …Or the Return of Baky’s Thugs? 
In 2013, the European Roma Right Centre released a report detailing 61 separate 
violent acts against Hungarian Roma, ranging from January 2008 to September 2012. The 
list describes events that claimed nine lives with dozens of additional injuries, some 
serious. Many of these cases involved discharged weapons, Molotov cocktails, and even 
hand grenades.154 It is possible that few of these attacks were perpetrated by members of 
the Hungarian Guard, but the surging level of hate crimes in Hungary are often associated 
with the poster child for Magyar thuggery. 
Jobbik has suffered international relations setbacks due to the glut of violence 
towards minorities, but the formation of the Hungarian Guard also resulted in a huge loss 
of leadership. Several months after the Guard was created, a Hungarian news agency 
reported that “[t]hree founding members of the radical right-wing Jobbik party, including 
former chairman Dávid Kovács, have left the party, declaring that it has become too 
radical … Joining Kovács are Márton Fári, a former chairman of the party’s ethics 
committee, and Ervin Nagy, a former president of Jobbik’s national council.”155 The 
news report claimed all three cited the Hungarian Guard as a major source of contention 
aside from the party’s increased radicalization. Furthermore, the article highlighted what 
may be argued as the Guard’s greatest weakness. Referring again to the former founders 
reasons for departure, the report concluded, “The biggest problem … is that Jobbik 
leaders have no effective way of vetting those who join the Magyar Gárda.”156  
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Hungary is a hotbed for extreme-right hate groups; the Athena Institute has 
identified eight extremist groups and is monitoring an additional seven.157 Some of these 
groups take a much more active and violent approach with regard to race relations. Zsolt 
Tyirityán, leader of the Betyársereg (Outlaw’s Army), recently called on Hungarians 
to, “Stop being the prey and start being predators.”158 On another occasion, Tyirityán 
described the path of the eminent race war with the Roma, saying, “Even though we 
cannot annihilate them,” reports the Athena Institute, “[An] apartheid system should be 
put into place … The Gypsy has no place in the lebensraum of the Hungarians.”159 One 
of the greatest problems with the Hungarian Guard is that it has no apparatus to screen 
potential members—it has no way to ensure it is not populated with members of more 
virulent hate groups such as Tyirityán’s.160 
D. CONCLUSION 
Jobbik has set itself apart from the other political parties in Hungary by 
addressing issues of contemporary politics that are controversial and have heretofore 
remained untouched by more mainstream parties that adhere to the political culture of 
democratic Europe since 1945 and especially of the EU in its happier years. While its 
designs and motives leave little doubt of their racist nature with the threat of violence, 
Jobbik has cleverly worded them in such a way as to leave enough room to maneuver 
along the border of nationalism and xenophobia—but the cracks in the façade are 
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beginning to show as the culture of extremism and violence become generalized 
throughout Europe once more.  
Hungary has issues with crime and no one would begrudge it the right to 
introduce increased levels of security and protection. All across Europe, countries employ 
gendarmes to enforce law and order, especially in their rural communities; it would seem 
that a carefully constructed gendarmerie would serve Hungary’s purposes well, but the 
Hungarian Guard will never successfully fill that role for two reasons. First, a future 
Hungarian Gendarmerie will be forced to overcome the historical baggage of the Nazi 
and Hungarian Holocaust; it will need to prove that it could not be capable of the same 
atrocities of its predecessors. Ironically, and in a process that should cause some dismay 
among observers of political culture in Central Europe in the midst of crisis, the 
Hungarian Guard seems to embrace its awful heritage instead of distancing itself from it, 
as has been the case in such nations as Germany, Austria, and France. The Guard’s 
marches through minority neighborhoods, wearing garb linked to fascism, sends an 
unmanageable message of fear and intimidation, not that of service and protection. 
Second, the Hungarian Guard takes its orders from a radical political party, not from a 
legitimate government, and therefore lacks any semblance of validity. Without a 
legitimacy derived from the government, the Hungarian Guard lacks credibility, but even 
more ominously, it lacks oversight and restraint. Without these characteristics, the 
Hungarian Guardsmen have become vigilantes focused not on crime prevention but on 
racial intimidation. 
As it stands now, the Hungarian Guard is not the second coming of the fascist-led 
gendarmerie of World War II, but neither is it a passive neighborhood watch. Its greatest 
danger comes from what it could become if Jobbik comes to power in Hungary. At that 
point, the Guard will gain legitimacy without restraint, and may seek to enforce a 
Hungarian people’s community, reordered to be an ethnically pure state and society. 
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V. CONCLUSION: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?  
Hungary lies at the heart of Europe and has represented much of the West’s hope 
for the new democracies that emerged from the Warsaw Pact a quarter century ago. Both 
the EU and NATO expressed their confidence in and commitment to Hungary by 
including it in their initial post-Cold War expansions into Eastern Europe in the 1990s; 
they were hopeful that Hungary would prove to be a beacon of freedom and progress for 
other similar new democratic nations in the region. Sadly, it appears that Hungary’s 
commitment to democracy has waned as its virulent nationalism rises amid the crisis of 
Europe and beyond. In this national project alone, Fidesz and Jobbik are unwitting allies 
in Hungary’s incremental retreat from the West—backsliding into autocracy. Panic grips 
the hearts of some observers, eager to restrain a resurgent heritage of hate. For others, it 
yields a sense of sadness; a country deserving of a political and cultural comeback seems 
to have lost its way in the dead end of integral nationalism. 
A. WHAT CAN THE WEST DO? 
Member states of the EU and NATO are familiar with the situation in Hungary. 
While no one can confidently predict where Hungary’s autocratic and far-right drift will 
end from the perspective of 2014, recent European experience has shown that the worst-
case scenario is possible, and that when a country proceeds down this path as in the case 
of the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, it may drag the rest of Europe into a 
destructive conflict. Therefore, both NATO and the EU have a stake in a happier 
outcome. 
1. NATO: Security Supersedes Democracy 
NATO and its leading nations have a right to be interested in the state of affairs in 
Hungary. The North Atlantic Treaty’s preamble states: “Parties to this treaty…are 
determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, 
founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”161 It is 
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clear that NATO is concerned with the preservation of democracy, but its chief focus is 
on the preservation of peace through collective defense and deterrence. The primacy of 
security through collective defense over such considerations as fully functioning 
democracy was evident at the foundation of the Atlantic alliance; Portugal joined as an 
authoritarian regime and remained so until the completion of its 1976 constitution. 
Current NATO partners include constitutional monarchies, such as Jordan and Morocco, 
as well as autocratic nations like Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.162 
Several historical examples provide some insight into NATO’s probable reaction 
to current events in Hungary. For example, in April 1967, a military junta established a 
dictatorship in Greece in response to an anticipated communist coup. NATO maintained, 
according to Effie Pedaliu, “[t]hat there was no contradiction between the preamble of its 
founding treaty and the authoritarian practices of some members, [and] the alliance 
asserted that its remit was the defense of the West from Soviet attack, not interference in 
domestic affairs.”163 The United States showed even fewer qualms about maintaining an 
allied relationship with Greece under “the colonels;” heavy weapons and other military 
equipment continued to flow to the dictators in Greece.164  
Greece’s neighbor to the East has had similar governmental disruptions. Modern 
Turkey has experienced three military coups, beginning in 1960. The Menderes-led 
government of Turkey worked closely with the West in 1950–1960 to implement 
NATO’s strategic goals for the region, but these acts of fidelity were not enough to 
garner intervention from other NATO member states when Menderes was overthrown by 
his own military. Upon seizing power, the military junta immediately expressed its 
loyalty to NATO; the Alliance took no action in Turkey and the United States quickly 
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sent economic aid to the new government.165 Two additional Turkish military coups 
played out similarly in 1971 and 1980.166 NATO leaders may have believed they could 
exercise a more democratizing influence on Turkey within the context of the alliance, or 
they may have been more alive to Turkey’s sensitive geo-political position than to its 
internal turmoil. Either way, the alliance accommodated Turkey’s unhappy civil-military 
interludes in the name of security and stability. 
In at least one instance, “security and stability” have accommodated open conflict 
between two NATO states. Greece and Turkey joined NATO together in 1952; despite a 
long history of conflict, they were in the midst of several decades of peace and 
cooperation.167 In 1955, however, divisions in the island nation of Cyprus produced 
tensions that pitted the two NATO members against each other. Cyprus is largely divided 
between an ethnic Greek majority and an ethnic Turkish minority, and its future remains 
a contested issue between its paternal nations.168 The tensions that began with Greek-
Cypriot unification efforts threatened to give way to a Turkish invasion in the 1960s, and 
NATO pursued avenues of diplomacy and threats to forestall hostilities. In 1974, Turkey 
invaded Cyprus, forcing many Greeks to flee to the southern part of the island. Again, the 
other NATO allies refused to themselves itself militarily in the deteriorating comity 
between two member states along the Alliance’s southern flank, but chose to enforce 
ineffective military embargos. 169  
Today, Cyprus exists as a partitioned state, both politically and nationally.170 
While the Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus has never evolved into outright war, the 
region has arguably transitioned through multiple stages of destabilization and remain’s 
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volatile today. In view of these precedents, NATO might be expected to accommodate 
Hungary, even if a Jobbik-influenced government pushes harder for the rights and status 
of ethnic Hungarians in neighboring states (even if they, too, are NATO members). 
Finally, during the 1974–75 Portuguese Revolution, there was a strong possibility 
that a communist-influenced government would succeed in a complete governmental 
takeover in Portugal. This development would have been extremely awkward as the 
leading NATO member, the United States, was engaged in anti-communist efforts in 
Vietnam during the height of the Cold War. As NATO has no provisions to revoke 
membership, the most the other NATO Allies could do was to prevent the Portuguese 
from receiving classified briefings, which the Portuguese had already declined to 
attend.171 
Uzbekistan is a more recent example of NATO’s willingness to work with less-
than-democratic countries. Uzbekistan is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace, yet 
it has earned a dismal “Not Free” rating from Freedom House.172 Still, NATO has 
overlooked Uzbekistan’s continually wavering in its democratic rigor, in return for basing 
rights in support of the Alliance’s current Afghanistan operations.173 
A Jobbik-led or -influenced government would be of concern to NATO, but 
NATO probably would not attempt to influence its course overtly. In any event, Hungary 
will maintain its strategic usefulness to the Alliance regardless of whether it can maintain 
a Western-style democracy. The only scenario that might provoke the other NATO Allies 
to action would be a forceful attempt by a Jobbik-led or –influenced government to re-
create the borders of a pre-1919 Hungary, or any other action that would upset the 
stability and security of the region. However, given NATO’s reluctance to involve itself 
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in regional conflicts, like Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania might look elsewhere for 
assistance. It seems that although the NATO Allies will continue to monitor events in 
Hungary, they will defer action to other European institutions. 
2. The European Union: Good Intentions but Weak Resolve 
The EU is similarly interested in Jobbik’s actions, but to a greater extent than 
merely its effect on the stability and security of the region. Rather, the EU is concerned 
with the effect Jobbik might have on democratic institutions and human rights in 
Hungary.174 While the EU has a limited toolkit to deal with member countries that act in 
ways that undermine its charter, its track record suggests that it may be as ineffective as 
NATO in holding out for good democratic citizenship. 
The Austrian general elections of 1999 produced a coalition government, 
including the incumbent and a far-right nationalist party, the Freedom Party of Austria 
(FPÖ).175 Although the FPÖ was not a new party, its electoral success in 1999 and its 
neo-Nazi heritage caught the attention of the West, much as Jobbik has done recently.176 
Before the election and its resulting coalition government were finalized, the 14 other 
members of the EU warned Austria that if the FPÖ were included in the Austrian 
government, the other member states would, 1) cease bilateral relations with Austria; 2) 
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withhold support of Austrian candidates running for international offices; and 3) reduce 
the recognition of the Austrian ambassadors to a technical level.177 
The Fourteen, as they styled themselves, sent a clear message to Austria and any 
other EU member states wishing to include radical elements in their government, but it 
failed dramatically at the outset and did not improve thereafter. The threatened sanctions 
were intended to convince the Austrians not to include the FPÖ in their government. The 
threat was ineffective; the coalition government was formed with the FPÖ, and the 
Fourteen enacted the sanctions.178 The haphazard coordination through the various 
European Union entities or perhaps differing agendas stood out as the European 
Commission failed to follow suit with the Fourteen, and pledged to continue working 
relations with Austria until it could be determined that Austria had violated any European 
treaty. 
The Austrians responded to the soft sanctions with conditions of their own; the 
Austrian government retaliated with threats to block EU constitutional reforms, new 
members to the Union, and new tax initiatives that were intended to benefit the EU.179 As 
time progressed, the resolve of some of the Fourteen began to waver; Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Italy, and Ireland sought ways to end the sanctions against Austria. A plan was 
conceived to appoint a council of “Three Wise Men”180 to determine if Austria had 
indeed breached any common European values. After a period of approximately three 
months, the council determined that although the FPÖ was politically incorrect, it had not 
violated any of the EU treaties. The sanctions were immediately terminated, and the EU 
proceeded to put the political nightmare behind it.181 The EU’s sanctions against Austria 
showed that although well intended, the European Union cannot muster the resolve to 
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manage undesirable conduct in its member states, especially when there is not sufficient 
strength in the treaties to warrant such intervention. 
Subsequent attempts to construct barriers against far-right governments have been 
undertaken within the EU with even less effect. In December 2000, only a few short 
months after the Austrian debacle, the EU adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
This document included language that was meant to prevent member state governments 
from seriously and persistently violating human rights. Unfortunately, however, the 
charter did not include means of enforcement.182 Legal protection of minority rights 
would have to wait until the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union could 
be included in the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon.183 After the fiasco regarding Austria, and given 
the EU penchant for plodding toward consensus, it may be difficult or impossible for the 
EU to enforce the charter.184 
3. Current Options for European Intervention 
More than a decade has passed since the failed censure of Austria, yet the specter 
of right-wing extremism within Europe strengthens despite the EU’s increased focus, as 
noted by Michael Gehler: 
The discussion about right-wing populism in Europe, which had occurred 
simultaneously to the policy of isolation toward Austria, had no 
moderating effect upon the extremist tendencies in other European states. 
Neo-Nazi excesses against foreigners increased in Germany, blatant hatred 
of foreigners was articulated in Spain against Moroccans, and animosity 
towards foreigners, as well as racism, and brutal anti-Semitism intensified 
in France. A nationalist wave threatened to come into existence.185 
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Arguably, this wave has arrived and is strengthening itself with the ill effects of the Euro 
crisis and the long duration of the economic, social, and political crisis in the past decade. 
Since the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, well-established far-right parties in France, Germany, and 
Italy have surged in popularity, while new ones in countries such as Finland, Hungary, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden have joined them.186 If EU efforts since 1999 have not 
successfully discouraged the rise of the right in its member states, what else can be done? 
The question becomes much more pressing when, as with Jobbik, the movement in 
question brings the threat of autocracy. 
Jan-Werner Müller acknowledges that EU intervention into member states’ affairs 
is problematic, citing common perceptions of EU hypocrisy and larger state 
favoritism.187 Müller also concedes that the EU is not likely to ever invoke the “nuclear 
option” known as Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty—most members might not support the 
move over fears that it will one day be turned against them.188 Müller also acknowledges 
the possibility of granting additional power to the European Courts to address Article 2 
violations in Hungary, but in the end, he recommends that the Copenhagen Commission 
work in concert with the European Commission to identify and warn states that are 
abandoning the principles of democracy. If the warnings go unheeded, the Commissions 
could assess significant fines or limit access to EU subsidies.189 
                                                 
186 Michael Minkenberg, “The European Radical Right and Xenophobia in West and East: Trends, 
Patterns and Challenges,” in Right-Wing Extremism in Europe, ed. Ralf Melzer and Sebastian Serafin 
(Frankfurt: Druck, 2013), 9–15. 
187 Jan-Werner Müller, “Defending Democracy within the EU,” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 2 
(2013): 138. Müller’s full description of the widely viewed concerns follows: 
There are four commonly voiced concerns about such interventions: 1) They would be 
hypocritical because the EU itself is not democratic and therefore lacks the credibility to 
act as the continent’s democracy watchdog; 2) there is no single, fully agreed-upon model 
of European liberal democracy that could serve as a guideline or checklist for 
determining whether a country is departing from shared “European standards”; 3) such 
interventions are in and of themselves paternalistic and, ultimately, illiberal; and 4) only 
smaller, relatively powerless member states would ever be subject to interference from 
Brussels. 
188 Bărbulescu, “Constructing the Roma,” 279–89. Bărbulescu summarizes France’s deportation of 
Roma populations as late as 2010. Then-President Sarkozy enacted legislation which enabled him to revoke 
the citizenship of those found to be a security risk to the nation; this move cleared the path for mass 
deportation. 
189 Müller, “Defending Democracy within the EU,” 146–48. 
 69 
Erin Jenne and Cas Mudde note that international organizations, such as the IMF, 
have convinced Hungary to modify its economic decisions in the past, specifically 
regarding, “legislation addressing the international community’s criticisms about fiscal 
laxity and the lack of judicial independence.”190 Jenne and Mudde echo Müller’s 
recommendation for the EU to develop more limited capabilities, alongside Article 7, to 
restrict loans or subsidies for Hungary. These threats would give the EU a more tailored 
and flexible capability for coercion.191 
These arguments for the EU’s intervention in Hungary may prove to be 
shortsighted; the authors are quick to acknowledge some of their vulnerabilities. First, 
international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, have not shown a 
desire to interfere in domestic policies, aside from financial matters.192 Second, any 
outside interference on the part of the EU would play into the hands of not only Jobbik, 
but also the ruling center-right party, Fidesz. Both parties would portray any EU 
restrictions as an attempt to further limit Hungarian sovereignty, giving additional 
momentum to the political shift to the right. Finally, Jobbik has repeatedly stated that it 
intends to remove Hungary from the EU. If Jobbik comes to power, any threats tied to 
EU membership will become meaningless; Jobbik will withdraw from the EU and seek 
economic and political alliances to the East. 
4. The EU versus Nationalism: More Harm than Good? 
Not only is it doubtful that the EU can do anything substantial to suppress the 
progress of extreme nationalism in Hungary, but there are compelling arguments that its 
policies have actually aggravated the situation. Hungary’s brand of irredentism is 
complex, extending beyond the lands stripped away by the Treaty of Trianon, but 
Jobbik’s unveiled desires to reclaim the territory lost after World War I justify significant 
apprehension on the part of Hungary’s neighbors and Europe as a whole. John Fox and 
Peter Vermeersch illustrate how the EU’s attempts to erase the significance of European 
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borders actually exacerbated these international tensions. Blurred national borders 
allowed Hungary to create strengthened ties with its one-time citizens, against the wishes 
of Slovakia and Romania. Hungary eagerly, and perhaps ironically, supported human 
rights and the monitoring that accompanied it. Now countries that had marginalized 
ethnic Hungarian minorities were losing significant control over them. The fuzzy borders 
also aided Hungary in its efforts to lessen the claim that its neighbors had on their 
Trianon acquisitions.193 
B. “IF NOT US, WHO?” 
As Jenne and Mudde conclude their analysis of democracy and the far right in 
Hungary, they seem to lament the situation: “The international community will probably 
continue to critique the Fidesz government’s authoritarian turn without overtly 
intervening in Hungarian domestic politics. It is therefore up to Hungary’s democratic 
opposition to assert itself.” While the comment is directed towards the Fidesz 
government, it applies just as well to Jobbik. Hungary’s extreme version of far-right 
politics emerged soon after the fall of communism, and it has only strengthened despite 
the international handwringing.  
The West may have every reason to forestall Hungary’s march to autocracy, but it 
is bound by various constraints. NATO outlasted the Warsaw Pact, in part, due to its 
focus on its collective defense. Its ability to resist dabbling in the domestic politics of its 
member states kept the Alliance solid enough to maintain a deterrent effect against its 
foe. It is highly unlikely that NATO will abandon this proven strategy. The EU failed in 
its one serious attempt to influence a member state’s far-right government, and it is 
unlikely to attempt it again for several reasons. The failure is still fresh in the EU’s 
collective memory, and the current political environment may preclude it from building a 
willing coalition of EU representatives to attempt a similar action. Hungary is not the 
only EU member experiencing a popular rise of the right, nor is Jobbik the only far-right 
party with European Parliament representation. The right-left split in the European 
Parliament played an important part in the failure of the FPÖ sanctions; it will likely 
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prevent the success or even the attempt of such a venture in the future. Furthermore, 
Hungary is not the only EU member with a questionable record in respecting human 
rights; the Roma face comparable treatment in Italy and are routinely deported in 
France.194 
It seems clear that if Hungary is to be saved from a continued backslide toward a 
Jobbik-led or -influenced government, the Hungarians will have to do it themselves. The 
West will no doubt express encouragement, but as in 1956, it will find reasons to stay on 
the sidelines. It is therefore up to the people of Hungary. They will need to decide what 
kind of government they want to represent them and how their government will treat its 
people. They will decide if their government dictates policies and actions based on a 
people’s heritage or in spite of it. Hungarian voters will dictate whether the past 20 years 
of democratization were a beginning or an end. 
C. CONTEXT HAS MEANING: THE VIEW FROM HUNGARY 
This study has documented the justified apprehension of the international 
community concerning the state of affairs in Hungary. Few, aside from the far right, will 
attempt to justify the policies and actions of Jobbik and their ilk. Jobbik, as a party, is 
anti-Roma and anti-Semitic, as are many of its supporters. The Hungarian Guard operates 
above the law and harbors the threat of a return to fascism. Jobbik would abandon 
democracy and a liberal economy and replace them with a vaguely defined state-run 
apparatus. From the perspective of the West, and from the United States in particular, 
nothing worse could be imagined—this would be a clear-cut disaster. From the vantage 
of Eastern Europe, however, and from Hungary in particular, things are not so clear. 
Context has meaning. This is not to say that context can excuse Jobbik, but before others 
attempt to solve Hungary’s problem, they should understand Hungary’s context. 
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Figure 1.  The geographical and national consequences of the 1920 Treaty of 
Trianon195 
For observers in the United States (except, perhaps, for Native Americans), it is 
nearly impossible to understand the trauma that the Treaty of Trianon represents for 
Hungarians—the loss of 71 percent of the country and 64 percent of its population. Péter 
Hanák described the blow that was suffered in 1921, which still reverberated as he wrote 
his 1981 memoir: 
Our collapse in the war and (the terms of the Treaty of) Trianon have 
found the nation unprepared. Everything that up to that point used to be 
absolute, concrete and unambiguous was suddenly shattered. The unity of 
our country and of our nation vanished, and so did all our fictitious 
conceptualizations, as well as all historical and geographical 
realities... The trauma of defeat was so terribly deep, and it shook the 
nation's life-foundations to such a degree that for years and even for 
decades we could hardly expect anyone...to come up with an objective 
assessment (of this whole affair). After all, (Trianon meant) not only the 
dismemberment of a nation, but also the sudden relativization of such 
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formerly absolute concepts as the nation and national destiny.... One can 
hardly be amazed, therefore, that the initial reaction was (an intense 
desire) to revise the whole peace system.... Trianon had in fact set a 
double trap for the Hungarian nation. On the one hand, it conscribed all 
elemental patriotism, all inclination to reconstruct one's nation, all justified 
emotions of grief into the service of...the counterrevolutionary regime; on 
the other hand, its flagrant injustices beclouded its righteous aspects, 
namely those of its features that were the unavoidable consequences of 
national developments in Central and Southeastern Europe. As such, 
(Trianon) prevented us from recognizing the relativity of our place and 
role in the world, and the necessity of establishing good relations with the 
Danubian peoples.... Thus, the Trianon trap had a tighter grip of the 
majority of our nation than did the dualistic system (that preceded it). The 
most grotesque aspect of this tragic trap was that thereafter (Hungarian) 
national consciousness found itself bound not to a living, but to a non-
existing, to a vanished absolute.196 
The treaty has left its imprint on nearly every significant political movement since 
its inception, from Admiral Horthy’s regime to Ferenc Szálasi’s Arrow Cross, from 
Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz to Gábor Vona’s Jobbik. Steven Várdy describes the aftermath of 
Trianon as a disease; 197 it is a malignant malady that still affects most Hungarians, 
regardless of heritage or creed. Cosmopolitan politics cannot restore what was lost; 
therefore, any movement that acknowledges the injustice of Trianon gains a measure of 
credibility—and any party that prescribes a cure gains a following. 
The Hungarians, like many other Eastern Europeans, have experienced the 
schizophrenic nightmares of revolving occupations. The nomadic Magyars settled in 
Hungary in approximately 1000 A.D. As with most peoples of their age and region, they 
developed a proud heritage, one that was only magnified and supplemented in the 
nationalistic fervor of 1848. In the past 100 years, however, the Habsburgs, the Germans, 
and the Soviets have occupied Hungary—to say nothing of the preceding occupation by 
the Ottomans, yet after all these occupations comes the EU. Although the EU carries the 
hopes of economic stability and enduring peace, it comes at the price of deductions from 
full national sovereignty and a circumscribed national identity. Justifiably or not, some 
Hungarians see increased Europeanization (or worse, globalization) as just one more 
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occupation. Is it any wonder that many Hungarians are willing to resort to unconventional 
or extreme methods in order to assert their version of Hungarian heritage and nationality? 
Context is important. Context brings focus to an otherwise blurry understanding 
of complex situations. Context, however, cannot excuse truth. Jobbik is a party that feeds 
off of fear, misplaced pride, an unwillingness to accept blame, and a desire to recreate an 
unrecoverable past. 
This study has focused on Jobbik: its roots, its policies, its ramifications, and 
possibilities for addressing them. However cathartic it may feel to dissect a cultural tumor 
like Jobbik, society cannot remain content with its biopsy. Jobbik is not the problem. 
Jobbik is the manifestation of centuries-old hatred and fear. When Jobbik declines, it will 
be because its supporters feel that it has lost its way. Then, the far right in Hungary will 
lend their support to future far-right parties promising to take up the political march 
against the “other.” Until Hungarians can come to terms with the nation’s current reality, 
acknowledge the sins of their fathers, and view the Hungarian nation without ethnic 
borders, Jobbik—and its political progenies—will remain a potent political force. 
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